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PREFACE
’’Experts concluded that within two years of any future Pearl
Harbor, the United States would be back in full war produc-
tion of everything. The question was: would the United
States have that much time?”
Newsweek, April 12, 1948.
’’Because military strength is composed of equal parts of mat-
erial and men, industry is an essential element in any secur-
ity structure. One lesson that every war in the past century
has taught us is that the nation most quickly mobilizing its
entire industrial potential to the war effort is the one most
likely to win.”
R. P. Patterson, Secretary of War, November, 1945.
President Wilson once said, ”In the sense in which we have
been wont to think of armies, there are no armies in this
struggle. There are entire nations armed. Thus the men who
remain to till the soil and man the factories are no less a
part of the army that is France than the men beneath the
battle flags. It must be so with us. It is not an army
that we must shape and train for war; it is a nation.”
Problems of Industrial Mobilization . National Industrial
Conference Board, January 16, 1943.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. Position of the United States in World Affairs
Today the United States finds itself in the fore-
front of world leadership, having been forced there by the
international developments of the past few decades. This
position of importance carries with it many responsibilities
and dangers.
Certainly no potential enemy will ever again under
rate our power and our great industrial capacity when plann-
ing any future war, and certainly any future conflict of
any importance will involve this country.
2. Demands of Total War
Modern warfare embraces the entire economy of the
warring nations, depending not only on the men in the trench
es, on the seas, and in the air, but also on the men on the
farms, in the mines, in the forests, and in the factories.
The military forces, the industrial forces, and the agric-
ultural forces all stand on an equal footing with equal res-
ponsibilities. Machines and industrial capacity hold as
important a place in the economic setting as do their human
creators
.
We have learned from two world struggles that
belligerent nations demand from the industrial capacity of
their countries a level of production which is far greater
than anything attainable under ordinary peacetime conditions
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A total war demands unity of purpose with all of
the resources of the warring nations, all of the productive
capacity, all of the consumptive activities - all of the
economic activities directed toward the defeat of the enemy.
It is obvious that such an all-out offensive may be carried
on only with firm government direction.
Total war is a conflict between sovereign states,
sponsored and waged by entire societies in arms. Total war
has no specific objectives, having as its aim the utter des-
truction of the enemy nations and the complete disappearance
of these enemy nations from the face of the earth.
Modern war is fought on land, on the sea, and in
the air with modern technological, psychological, and economic
weapons being employed. The lines of demarcation which used
to divide war and peace, belligerents and non-belligerents
is fast fading away.
3. Past Mobilization Efforts
In a democratic country the defense effort rests
firmly on the rational decision of a free people, while the
military or dictatorial state, in its very existence, is bound
to rest on emotion and distorted facts.
The government of the United States acts as the
servant of the people and not as their master. In peace-
time, regimentation has been a thing abhorred, a tool of
dictators, and out of tune with our free American way of
life.
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We have been successful in all of our past wars
because of our tremendous potential and also because we
have had time to bring this potential into play. One factor
without the other is of little use. Let us consider the
usual pattern of mobilizing for war in the past.
The United States would remain unprepared until
the agressor nation was fully armed and well unaer way in a
program of ruthless expansion. The people of the United States
would remain apathetic until standing at the very brink of
war. Then they would start arming, only half-heartedly in a
meager defense movement. Finally, when the blow was struck
and this country was literally forced into the war, the
people would rise mightly and conquer the enemy.
When the struggle was over, our people would erase
the unpleasant memories and turn their attentions to the prob-
lems of peace once again, forgetting the inconveniences and
difficulties of war.
We could, in the past, sit smugly behind the pro-
tection of two oceans as natural defenses. We could wait and
see in the past because warfare moved slowly and tne possib-
ilities of invasion were academic questions due to the diffi-
culties of supply. We had time - time to marshal our resour-
ces, time to convert our industrial potential to the business
of making war goods, time to develop synthetic rubber, time
to develop atomic bombs, and time to recruit and train armies.
We made great technological strides in the past
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war, but so aid the rest of the w'orld, and now science has
shrunk our two oceans to almost insignificant defenses by
the perfection of new weapons and long-range aircraft.
4 . The Present Emergency
The so-called ’’cola war” has been directed mainly
at the United States, and the present controversy over the
Berlin blockade is so serious a threat to world peace that
it has been referred to the Security Council of the United
Nations.
It is sheer folly to think that the United States
would not be the first and primary target of any future
agressor because of the lessons learned in the past. 1/Ve
must face reality and understand that we will not have the
precious time to prepare, in the event of a future war, which
has proved to be our salvation in the past.
It is the duty of our government, therefore, to
foresee its possible role in any future conflict and to formu-
late complete plans for total mobilization of the entire
economy. Such planning must cover three broad areas of
mobilization: mobilization of industry, mobilization of raw
materials, and mobilization of manpower. The planning for
mobilization must also embrace the necessary controls to
maintain an effective economy.
Military and economic mobilization must be complete
,
precise, and capable of instant execution for it is clear
that we will not have the time to improvise that we had in
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World War II. Our economic resources are very definitely
not unlimited, and the effectiveness and speed with which
we use our available resources may spell the difference
between victory and defeat in any future conflict.
5. Scope of This Thesis
This thesis proposes to show why it is so necess-
ary to plan for the mobilization of industry and what part
the industry of the United States will play in this planning.
A brief description of the organization for national defense
is given along with the procedure followed in surveying a plant
and assigning a tentative production schedule, not only to
show what government agencies are administering the function,
but also to give a picture of industry's place in the pro-
cedure.
Industrial Mobilization is an elusive term demand-
ing careful definition. It could well be defined as the plan
for mobilizing the industrial plants only, that is, convert-
ing plants from the production of typewriters to machine guns,
stockings to parachutes, or automobiles to aircraft; or it
could be defined as the detailed plans for mobilizing and
controlling manpower, transportation, power, raw materials,
plant capacity, machines and tools, and finances, as well as
the controls necessary to maintain a stable economy. Some
writers use the terms industrial mobilization and economic
mobilization interchangeably, although economic mobilization
is a much broader term.

MThis thesis confines its consideration of indus-
trial mobilization to those problems closest to industry,
demanding careful attention on the part of industry, such as:
mobilization of manpower, materials, machine tools, and
facilities, as well as the efforts directed toward the strat-
egic relocation of industry.
For the purposes of this study, economic controls
necessary to maintain a stable economy as well as possible
tax legislation in the event of a future emergency will be
considered as outside of the sphere of industry 1 s influence,
so outside of tne scope of industrial mobilization. In short,
the term industrial mobilization planning will be used to
include those activities necessary to mobilize the plants
themselves and those factors necessary for the operation of
the plants.
Industrial mobilization planning consists essen-
tially of planning, in advance of any future emergency,
exactly what industry, the government, and the armed forces
will have to do to cope with that emergency. The purpose is
to permit a smooth but speedy transition from peacetime prod-
uction to a wartime production which is capable of caring for
the needs of the United States Armed Forces, the allies of
the United States, and the civilian population. It will cause
a reduction of the uncertainties that arise during an emer-
gency and help to save that very precious and elusive factor
of time. It will permit the most efficient utilizatioh of
plants and equipment and also provide a basis for forecasting
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the manufacture of civilian goods.
Planning for industrial mobilization extends all
the way from the highest levels of the Armed Forces to the
managers of the smallest concerns capable of manufacturing
for the war effort. The burden of planning falls heavily
upon the shoulders of industry, so the success or failure
of the program from now on depends on the willingness of
private industry to co-operate.
It is necessary to determine the needs of the
future war time economy, take an inventory of the country's
industrial capacity, assign the capacity of individual plants
to the Armed Forces in accordance with the needs of each
branch, and anticipate all other additional activities which
are necessary to maintain the proposed production schedule.
6. Three Assumptions for Mobilization Planning
The present planning for industrial mobilization
is based on three fundemental assumptions concerning the
theoretical war to come. The most important of these
assumptions is that the next war will probably be a major
one, requiring complete and rapid utilization of resources,
industry, and manpower. The program is further tempered by
the assumption that the United States will be attacked in-
itially and without warning because any potential enemy must
have learned from the most recent war that it is essential
to neutralize the United States to achieve world dominitation.
The third assumption is that our industrial centers will be
",
the focal point of attack with war producers as high prior-
ity targets.
.
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SECURITY
Source:
Distributed
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course
on
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Mobilization
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at
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from
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CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION
1. Background
In the National Security Act of 1947, the Indus-
trial Mobilization Plan of the United States was given form.-
The deadline of the first comprehensive plan for industrial
mobilization is 1952 with less complete plans due annually.
Among the other agencies created under the prov-
isions of this act, were two organizations created to cope
with the problems of mobilization for the military, civilian,
and industrial segments of the economy. These two organiz-
ations are the National Security Resources Board and the
National Military Establishment. (See Exhibit I)
.
2. National Security Resources Board
The National Security Resources Board, the top
planning agency for industrial mobilization, is a permanent
civilian agency created to counsel the President on co-ord-
inating military, industrial, and civilian mobilization plans
in the event of any future emergency. This board must cope
with the problem of striking the most effective balance be-
tween military and civilian demands.
This agency must decide how many men can be thrown
against the enemy and supplied with the necessary arms and
supplies without stripping the civilian economy to a point
1. See Appendix for copy of this act

where it can not contribute most satisfactorily to the war
effort. Only by striking a balance is it possible to use
the nation’s resources most effectively.
This board must devise plans for recruiting men
and channeling them into both the armed forces and industry.
It must create plans for developing, applying, and administer-
ing government controls to make the most productive use of
the nation’s manpower and hold workers to essential jobs.
Under the jurisdiction of the National Security
Resources Board also come the problems of planning for con-
trol of the raw materials of the country, the production
and distribution of power, transportation and communications
facilities, production facilities, and even housing. To be
effective, this planning must be thorough and carefully
thought through in detail.
Organizational changes within the federal govern-
ment to meet the demands of a war time economy must also be
planned, and the blueprints must be drawn for maintaining
a stable economy with government control during times of
stress
.
This board must formulate policies for building
up adequate reserves of critical and strategic materials,
policies regarding stockpiling and conservation of these
materials
.
Studies must be made concerning the possible stra-
tegic relocation of all industries, services, government
.. .
.
activities, and all economic activities necessary to the
conduct of a war.
In addition, the National Security Resources Board
must maintain a continuous inventory of our resources of men
and materials, as well as our production facilities, and a
continuous appraisal of the demands for these factors in any
future war.
From this description of the duties of the Nation-
al Security Resources Board, it is apparent that this board
must maintain a comprehensive outlook of the whole economy
and keep a fine sense of values to carry out its mission.
3. The National Military Establishment
The National Military Establishment consists of
the organizations headed by the Secretary of Defense: the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the War Council, the Munitions Board,
the Research and Development Board, the Department of the
Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the
Air Force. The National Military Establishment will submit
its planned wartime requirements for manpower, materials,
and other resources to the National Security Resources Board
to be reviewed and consolidated with the estimated requirement
of the civilian and industrial segments of the economy in
order to determine whether or not planned wartime require-
ments can be met by available resources.
a. The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Defense serves as the principal

assistant to the President in all matters pertaining to
national security. It is his duty to establish general
policies and programs for the National Military Establish-
ment, to exercise general direction, authority, and control
over the establishment, to eliminate unnecessary duplic-
ation or overlapping in procurement, supply, transportation
storage, health, and research for the establishment, and to
supervise and co-ordinate budget matters of the component
activities under trie National Military Establishment
.
b. Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as the principle
military advisors to the President and to the Secretary of
Defense. They are responsible for the strategic planning
for and the general direction of the Armed Forces. They
formulate joint logistic plans and assign logistic respon-
sibility to the three services. They are responsible for
establishing necessary unified commands in strategic areas,
for co-ordinating the educational policies of the services,
for formulating joint training policies, and for reviewing-
major military material and personnel requirements under
their strategic and logistic plans. In addition, they
are responsible for providing United States representation
on the military staff committee of the United Nations.
c. The War Council
The V/ar Council is an advisory body to the Secre-
tary of Defense on matters pertaining to broad policy
matters of the Armed Forces, considering and reporting on
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such matters as the Secretary may direct.
d. The Munitions Board
The Munitions Board is the most important body
in the National Military Establishment as far as problems
of industrial mobilization planning are concerned. This
board was created as a subdivision of the National Military
Establishment under the Secretary of Defense to plan for the
military aspects of industrial mobilization and co-ordin-
ate the needs of the three branches of the Armed Forces
with regard to the relative priorities of their programs.
It is the function of this board to deal with the
assignment of procurement responsibility among the several
branches of the military services in such a manner as to
consolidate the procurement of as many items as possible,
to standardize specifications wherever possible, and to
allocate the purchase of technical and commonly used items
to one service.
Acting within the over-all policies laid down by
the National Security Resources Board, the Munitions Board
must prepare estimates of the country’s industrial poten-
tial and its manpower resources in order to evaluate the
ability of the United States to meet the military demands
of any future war.
It is this board which correlates military and
civilian needs by maintaining liason with all other agencies
and bureaus engaged in mobilization planning. A vital
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phase of this work is formulating policies regarding the
procurement, use, and stockpiling of certain strategic and
critical materials to the value of $3-154 billions and set-
ting aside machine tools worth $500 millions.
The Munitions Board also collects and analyzes
all materials, and personnel requests by all of the agencies
planning to meet military needs, making its recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense.
e. The Research ana Development Board
The mission of the Research and Development Board
is to advise the Secretary of Defense on the status of scien-
tific research in all matters pertaining to national secur-
ity and to assure that adequate provisions have been made to
keep research and development activities abreast of all new
developments in the world of science.
This board is responsible for the preparation of
an integrated military research and development program,
for recommendations to co-ordinate research and development
programs among the services, ana for allocating responsib-
ility for specific joint programs within the three services.
It must advise the Secretary of Defense on trends
in scientific research which affect the national security,
and it must take steps to insure constant progress in this
field. This board also formulates policies on research and
development activities outside the National Military Estab-
lishment. Finally, the Research and Development Board must
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carefully examine the effect of research and development in
all fields of science on the strategic plans formulated by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it must report the potential
effect of new developments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. Two Other Agencies Concerned u'itn National Security
a. The National Security Council
The National Security Council is an advisory
agency to the President and confines its agenda to subjects
requiring action by the President. It is concerned with
matters pertaining to the integration of domestic, foreign,
and military policy.
This council recommends policies regarding the
actual and potential military power of the United States,
considering the objectives, commitments, and risks of this
country. It recommends action on matters of common interest
to federal agencies concerned with national security.
b. The Central Intelligence Agency
The Central Intelligence Agency keeps the National
Security Council informed on the interests, intentions, and
capabilities of any nation which might conceivably affect
the security of the United States. It has no policing func-
tions, but rather serves as a source of information. Its
mission is to co-ordinate the intelligence activities of the
federal agencies concerned with national security.
Its duties are to advise the National Security
C ouncil on the national security intelligence activities
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of all federal departments and agencies, to recommend necess-
ary steps to co-ordinate such activities to the National
Security Council, to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate
national security intelligence, and to render intelligence
service to other federal departments and agencies.

CHAPTER III
STEPS IN INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PLaHEIEG
1. Overall Procedure
The first step in the planning for industrial
mobilization takes place at the highest levels of military
command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff develop the strategic
concepts of any possible war and determine the roles of the
three branches of the Armed Forces as well as their possible
sizes. The Chiefs of Staff must decide problems such as:
the possible date of any future war, the possible location
of the fighting, the nature of the fighting, the nature and
strength of the enemy’s forces, the duration of any future
war, climatic conditions to be encountered, and innumerable
strategic considerations of international scope.
The individual branches of the Armed Forces ana-
lyze the strategic requirements of their forces and break
them down into specific and detailed needs of munitions and
supplies
.
The Munitions Board receives tne schedules of the
Army, the Wavy, and the Air Force and consolidates them into
one complete schedule of military requirements. The board
co-ordinates and standardizes requirements at this point.
The Rational Security Resources Board receives the
schedule of military requirements from the Munitions Board
and co-ordinates the military needs with the essential needs
of the civilian economy. The industrial capacity of the
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country must be allocated in such a way that it is most
effective in carrying out the war effort and is least dis-
ruptive .
The National Security Resources Board notifies
the Munitions Board regarding the ability of the present
industrial capacity to care for the needs of the military
forces. The Munitions Board presents the three branches
of the Armed Forces, which have been assisting industry in
planning, with their co-ordinated requirements, and each
branch then contacts industry to work out the details.
The three branches survey the industrial capacity
of the country and request allocation of the capacity of
specific firms from the Munitions Board. The confirmation
of the allocation and the working out of the production
schedules with the individuals is the heart of industrial
mobilization planning.
With detailed plans for mobilization of industry
completed, our country will be better prepared to cope with
any future emergency which might arise. In the event of an
emergency, the President would declare an emergency and ask
for war powers. Congress w^ould grant the President war
powers and authorize him to put into effect the plan of
industrial mobilization. Mobilization would them begin at
once without unnecessary delays and confusion.
2. Allocation of Manufacturing Capacity
Allocation of manufacturing capacity is defined as
• jSjf'l
.
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The assignment of production capacity in manufacturing
facilities by the Munitions Board to a military depart-
ment for its procurement agencies to accomplish peace-
time planning for wartime procurement of designated
quantities of specified items of materiel at a speci-
fied rate of production.
This phase of industrial mobilization planning
follows the presentation of co-ordinated requirements to
the Armed Forces by the Munitions Board. The objective is
to discover how quickly the wartime requirements can be ob-
tained and where.
Allocation of capacity will eliminate confusion in
the assignment of the initial wartime peak load and will be
a very important factor in achieving the smooth and immediate
conversion from peacetime production to producing for a war
economy.
Industry will be brought into the program on a
purely voluntary basis and will be showed its role in any
future crisis. Each concern will be encouraged to co-op-
erate in formulating the plans and will be urged to learn
the part it can play.
The various government agencies will not have to
bid against each other for the capacity of industrial plants,
1. Munitions Board, Military Aspects of Industrial Mobilization,
Operating procedure annex #4?, (Washington, D.C., The
National Military Establishment, 1 March, 1948) p. 3.
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as was the case in the last war, but rather will have their
efforts concentrated on constructive activities. Co-op-
eration, not competition, will be fostered.
Through survey work and allocation of capacity, the
government will be accomplishing a dual purpose. It will be
primarily collecting an up-to-date record of competent pro-
ducers with knowledge of their capacity to produce specif-
ic goods, and it will also be collecting data as to what
war time demands can not be met with existing facilities.
By discovering what products can not be made under exist-
ing conditions, the planning officials will be able to deter-
mine what additional facilities will have to be built or
what existing facilities will have to be enlarged to meet
all requirements.
The final negotiation of contracts will await the
declaration of an emergency, but the final negotiations will
be a mere formality to reach an agreement as to prices and
terms. The details of the contracts will have been worked
out beforehand, cost estimates worked out, and production
schedules approved. When allocation is finally completed,
the industrial potential of the United States will be ready
to be mobilized, leaving only the clearance and approval of
contracts to be completed.
Emphasis has been placed on the military needs and
war time requirements, but mobilization planning must make
proper allowances for the civilian needs. Civilian needs
;.
are to be cared for by reserving fifty percent (50%) of
the normal peacetime capacity of any given plant in an
industry for civilian production. In other words, the
military needs will be met with the remaining fifty percent
of normal production plus any possible overtime or addition-
al shifts
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CHAPTER IV
CONDUCTING THE PLANT SURVEY
1. A Typical Example
In order to visualize the problems faced by tne
services in this phase of industrial mobilization planning,
let us consider, as a typical example, the procedure which
was followed by the Boston Quartermaster Industrial Mobil-
ization District Office in surveying a plant and requesting
allocation of capacity for the manufacture of duck cloth.
^
2. The Industrial Specialist
To carry on most of the survey work, the Boston
Industrial Mobilization Office employs industrial specialists,
civilian workers whose backgrounds and training well qual-
ifies them for this type of contact work. These industrial
specialists must have had at least six years of progressively
responsible experience in the industry concerned at an impor-
tant managerial level, or a combination of college v^ork and
experience at a high managerial level, because they must
confer with the heads of important manufacturing firms to
win their co-operation and gain their interest. They must
also possess an agreeable, impressive personality and demon-
strate initiative and aptitude for analytical research.
The work of an industrial specialist is doubly
difficult. In the first place, he has to sell managements
1. As observed on a field trip, October 18, 1948.
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on the idea of industrial mobilization and win their con-
fidence and co-operation in order to do an effective job.
As was stated earlier, industry is co-operating on a strict-
ly voluntary basis, so the companies approachea are free to
accept or reject the request for information. In the second
place, the industrial specialist has to be able to evaluate
a specific situation and make recommendations to the oper-
ating management.
Since duck is a textile item, the industrial
specialist assigned to this task is a specialist in the
textile industry, a graduate of a textile college who had
served in the industry for several years in private enter-
prise.
3. Preliminary Work
From the estimated mobilization requirements for
the Boston District, determined by the New York Quarter-
master Office, this specialist obtained the quantity of duck
required for the two year period following WM Day”. This
figure gave him the goal for which he must work and the
basis of his planning.
From the List of Facilities Requested by the
Office of the Quartermaster General for Industrial Capacity
Allocation the specialist selected one firm to see if the
desired capacity was available. This step is the beginning
of the final and detailed phase of industrial mobilization
planning.
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This list gives the following information for each
concern: the name, the location, the Munitions Board request
number, the Quartermaster request number, the status of the
facility, the chairman, the Armed Services Procurement
Officer, who co-ordinates planning in specific plants, and
all other claimants.
To serve as an introduction to the plant and to
seek an appointment with the management officials, a letter
was sent to the firm from the Quartermaster Office. This
letter was a copy of a form letter phrased with tact and
diplomacy to avoid arousing an unfavorable reaction.
In preparation for the plant survey, the industrial
specialist determined how many contracts were awarded to
this firm from June, 1940, through September, 1945. The
nature of these contracts might give an indication of how
large a percentage of the mobilization requirements can be
met by any specific firm. Since the financial responsib-
ility of a firm is also vitally important as an indicator
of its reliability as a supplier, the specialist also checked
the firm’s credit status from standard sources, such as:
Dun and Bradstreet or the Thomas Register .
4« Contacting the Plant
The data obtained on a plant visit are recorded on
MB form 104 (see exhibit III).
In conducting a plant survey, it is always the
policy to contact the top men in any organization : pres-
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Page 1 ©f 5 pages
1
THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
MUNITIONS BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES SURVEY
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 32-R010.
APPROVAL EXPIRES 30 JUNE 49.
REFERENCE:
SECTION VIII OF ANNEX NO. 47, Allocation
of private industrial capacity for pro-
curement planning of the Armed
Services.
Read Instructions on Reverse Side of Page 5 Before Filling in Form.
1. PARENT COMPANY
SUBSIDIARY OR DIVISION
NAME OR NUMBER OF PLANT SURVEYED
FINANCIAL RATING
DUN AND BRADSTREET THOMAS REGISTER
3. PRESENT PRODUCTS
ITEM SCC NO.
(4 digits)
UNIT VOLUME
(Per month)
DOLLAR VOLUME
(000’s per month)
PRESENT MAX. (Est.) PRESENT (MAX. Est.)
ESTIMATED
PERCENT SUB-
CONTRACTED
YEARS OF
PRODUCTION
EXPERIENCE
4. MAJOR ITEMS PROCURED FROM SUBCONTRACTORS FOR PRESENT PRODUCTS EXCLUDING BASIC MATERIAL
ITEM SCC NO.
(4 digits )
NAME AND LOCATION OF SUBCONTRACTOR
MB FORM 1 fM
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5. WORLD WAR II PRODUCTS
ITEM SCC NO.
(4 digits)
MAXIMUM UNIT VOLUME
(Per month)
MAXIMUM DOLLAR VOLUME
(000’s per month)
CONVERSION TIME
(Months
)
INIT. PROD. MAX. PROD.
5A. BOTTLENECKS ENCOUNTERED
6. MANUFACTURER’S PREFERRED WAR PRODUCTS
ITEM SCC NO.
(4 digits
)
MAXIMUM UNIT VOLUME
(Per month)
MAXIMUM DOLLAR VOLUME
(000’s per month)
CONVERSION TIME
(Months )
INIT. PROD. MAX. PROD.
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7. IS PLANT NOW ENGAGED IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORK FOR THE ARMED SERVICES? YES NO
8 . REAL ESTATE
ACRES FLOOR AREA (In square feet)
TOTAL NOW OCCUPIED AVAILABLE FOR EXPANSION TOTAL NOW OCCUPIED AVAILABLE FOR EXPANSION
STORAGE AREA (In square feet) ENVIRONMENT OF LOCATION
INDOOR OUTDOOR. COVERED OUTDOOR, OPEN
CITY SUBURBAN RURAL
SECURITY
PLANT PROTECTION YES NO FIRE PROTECTION YES NO
ALARM SYSTEM ALARM SYSTEM
GUARD FORCE SPRINKLER SYSTEM
FENCED OTHER
10 . TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES
RAILROADS
SIDING CAPACITY
CARS
NEAREST OTHER RAIL LOADING POINT
MILES
NEAREST SUITABLE CARGO AIRPORT
MILES
WATER TRUCK
INLAND
YES NO
DEEP SEA
YES NO
DOCK FRONTAGE
FT.
SUITABLE HIGHWAYS
YES NO
SUITABLE LOADING FACILITIES
YES NO
PERSONNEL ARE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES ADEQUATE.
INCLUDING ACCESSIBILITY?
YES NO
WHAT PERCENT OF EMPLOYEES REACH WORK BY PUBLIC TRANS-
PORTATION?
%
AIR
11 . HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
HOUSING IS COMPANY-OWNED HOUSING PROVIDED? YES NO; IF SO, IS IT ADEQUATE?
IS NONCOMPANY-OWNED HOUSING ADEQUATE? YES NO
YES
COMMUNITY FACILITIES
ARE COMMUNITY FACILITIES ADEQUATE (Schools, restaurants, shopping districts, etc.)! YES NO
12 . POWER AND FUEL
TYPE OF POWER USED PERCENT OF POWER
MANUFACTURED PURCHASED
FUEL USED
OIL
COAL
OTHER
GAS
13. EMPLOYMENT
CLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES
ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGERIAL
ENGINEERING. INCLUDING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
CLERICAL AND SALES
SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE
PRODUCTION AND MANUFACTURING TOTAL
SEMI-SKILLED
GRAND TOTAL
PRESENT
TOTAL
MAXIMUM
TOTAL MALE
14. PLANT WORKWEEK
WORK HOURS PER WEEK
PRESENT
15. TOOL DEPARTMENT CAPACITY
IS TOOL DEPARTMENT CAPABLE OF PRODUCING JIGS. DIES. AND FIXTURES FOR PRESENT PRODUCTS? YES NO
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16 . EQUIPMENT
LIST GENERAL CLASSES OF EQUIPMENT (Detailed listing not required)
17. RECORDED INTEREST IN PLANT AT TIME OF SURVEY
ARMY
CE CMLC MED ORD QM SC TC
NAVY
BUAER BUDOCKS BUMED BUORD BUSANDA BUSHIPS USMC
AIR FORCE
OTHER
18. REMARKS
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idents, operating vice presidents, or general managers.
The program must be carried on at the top levels of manage-
ment where decisions can be made and tentative committments
made. There appears to be generally a spirit of complete
co-operation and genuine interest in the industrial mobil-
ization planning.
To obtain the necessary information, the indus-
trial specialist in this case contacted the general man-
ager of the plant. After being introduced as to the purpose
of the visit and the goals of industrial mobilization plan-
ning, the general manager deemed it necessary to call in
his production manager, his controller, and the plant engin-
eer to supply detailed information.
5. The Interview
In an informal, conversational manner, the indus-
trial specialist determined what products the concern was
then producing and in what volume, what other products tne
firm could produce and in what volume, and what products the
firm produced during the war and in what volume.
From an analysis of the company* s present equip-
ment, the specialist discovered that the* company * s peace-
time production was limited to a specialized type of rug
and that the only wartime products which it could produce at
that time were twro very special grades of duck.
A further investigation showed that it took the
company from one to six months to convert their looms to
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wartime production in the last war.
The conversation lead to bottlenecks encountered
during the last war as well as particular labor difficulties
encountered. Although no serious difficulties were encoun-
tered, the operators of the looms making rugs were not able
to cope with the increased tempo of operations when their
looms were converted to the making of duck. The nervous
strain and deterioration of the quality of their work
necessitated training new workers to perform this task.
However, the locality supplied sufficient labor of the
required skills.
The company provided the investigator with a
detailed analysis of personnel, classifying them by the
following groups: Administrative and Managerial, Engineer-
ing, Clerical and Sales, Service and Maintenance, Production
and Manufacturing. These groups were classified according
to the present and maximum forces and according to Total and
Male employees. The production group was broken down into
Skilled, Semi-skilled, and Unskilled.
A vital part of a survey is an evaluation of the
company T s plant and equipment. The investigator listed all
of the important equipment and machinery with sufficient
attention to classification so that the potential products
could be positively determined. A record was also made of
the acreage then occupied and available for expansion, as
well as the floor area then occupied and available for
..
.
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expansion. Storage area in square feet, both indoor and
outdoor (covered and uncovered), was recorded, and the
environment of the location - city or suburban - was noted.
Discussing his relationships with the government
during the last war, the general manager stated that his
experience was very favorable and all dealings were satis-
factory. At that time the company was not engaged in
research or development work for the government.
Analyzing the security measures which the plant
had taken, the specialist discovered that the plant had
a guard force, an iron fence enclosing the plant, and an
alarm system. For fire protection the company had an
automatic sprinkler system coupled with an alarm system.
Since transportation is vitally important to a
company* s war time operations, tae adequacy of the transport-
ation facilities is considered in a survey. The capacity of
the railroad siding was recorded with the distance to the
nearest other rail loading point. The distance to the near-
est cargo airport was also noted because emergency shipments
of both finished goods and raw materials may be made by air.
The highway network was evaluated and loading facilities for
trucks described. The transportation for personnel is just
as important as transportation for materials, so record was
made of the adequacy of public transportation as well as
the percentage of employees depending on public transpor-
tation.
.-
.
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The housing facilities and community services
were mentioned in the conversation. In these times, housing
is a pressing problem in all industrial centers, so housing
had to be classified as inadequate. Community facilities,
such as: schools, restaurants, shopping districts, and ser-
vice establishments were considered adequate.
Power and fuel will be critical in any future
emergency, so it is necessary to consider these two factors
as they consider each individual firm producing for the armed
forces. This particular company was using electric power,
which it generated from coal.. The steam also provided heat
for the plant and power for the process.
The capacity of the tool department to produce
the necessary tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures for the pres-
ent products was considered and found to be adequate.
.
Finally, the attention of the meeting was focused
-
on the question of the normal work week. It was decided
that a forty-eight hour week was normal, so all planning
will be based on a forty-eight hour week. Twenty-four hours
a week will be allowed for civilian production, while
twenty-four hours plus all additional hours worked will be
allocated to wartime production for the purposes of indus-
trial mobilization planning.
6. Use of the Information
Armed with the information obtained in this survey,
the Quartermaster Corps can now see how this particular firm
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fits into its plans for industrial mobilization planning.
Knowing how much duck cloth of what type this firm can pro-
duce in case of emergency, the Quartermaster Corps is in
a position to request allocation of a definite amount of
the firm’s productive capacity, assuming no other claimant
and assuming that the plant is allocated to the Quarter-
master Corps entirely. Since the plant does not subcontract
any of its work, planning can be limited to this firm and
its suppliers.
Of course, the amount of information and the
detail requested depends on tne product under consideration,
the type of plant, and the amount of conversion necessary.
Obviously, it would take a much greater amount of planning
to prepare schedules for the production of jet engines than
it would to plan for the production of shoe lacings for
service shoes. The guide is the production schedule, and
only those facts needed to support production estimates
should be reported.
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CHAPTER V
REQUEST FOR ALLOCATION OF PRODUCTION CAPACITY
AND TENTATIVE SCHEDULE OF PRODUCTION
1. Form 101
The next step in the sequence of allocating pro-
ductive capacity is the request for the allocation of pro-
ductive capacity on Munitions Board Form 101 (see Exhibit
IV), which is completed and forwarded to the Munitions Board.
2. Data Required
The name of the plant, its location, its parent
company, its financial rating, the usual number of employ-
ees, the usual products manufactured with the United States
Government classification numbers, the quantity or value
of usual products manufactured - all of this information may
be taken from the data listed on the survey form.
In addition, the items for which capacity is
requested are listed, with classification numbers, in the
quantity desired during the first two years of mobilization.
The months required to supply this amount are estimated,
and a detailed record made of any retooling necessary.
For the purposes of mobilization planning it is
necessary to estimate the capacity available for civilian
production and for the production of other wartime products
after the need described has been met.
The form has provisions for clearance by various
agencies and approval by several officials, and it is sent

EXHIBIT IV
REQUEST FOR ALLOCATION OF PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
Form 101—MUNITIONS BOARD
National Military Establishment Peart 2 : Copy for Military Department
REQUEST FOR ALLOCATION OF PRODUCTION CAPACITY
SERVICE OR BUREAU REQUEST NO.
1. NAME OF PLANT DESIRED AND LOCATION 2. DIVISION OR SUBSIDIARY OF:
3. FINANCIAL RATING ITHOMAS) 4. EMPLOYEES TOTAL FEMALE MALE PERCENT MALE SKILLED
5. USUAL PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED: 6. SCC NO.
(4 DGTS.)
7. QUANTITY OR VALUE OF USUAL PRODUCTS
(MONTHLY OR YEARLY—SPECIFY)
ITEMS FOR WHICH CAPACITY IS REQUESTED
(8)
SCC NO.
(4 DIGITS)
(9)
UNIT
(10)
QUANTITY
DESIRED
(FIRST 2 YEARS
MOBILIZATION)
(ID
MOS. RQD.
TO SUPPLY
QNTY. DSRD.
(12)
CAPACITY REMAINING FOR PRODUCTION OF-
USUAL PRODUCTS
(13A)
OTHER PRODUCTS
(13B)
DATE TENTA-
TIVE SCHDL.
PRODUCTION
ACCEPTED
(14)
ESTIMATED VALUE
PRODUCTS UNDER
ALLOCATION
(15)
16. CLEARANCE FOR PLANT BY:
DATE:
17. CAPACITY CLAIMANT:
DATE:
19. CONCURRENCE FOR SERVICE OR BUREAU CHIEF:
DATE:
20. APPROVED FOR MILITARY DEPT.:
DATE:
18. CONCURRENCE BY ASPPO:
DATE:
21. APPROVED FOR MB:
DATE:
22. PLANT 23. ADDRESS 24. MB FACILITY INDEX NO.
T START TYPING HERE JUST ABOVE LINE OF PERFORATION. AFTER
TYPING ON BOTTOM LINE HAS BEEN COMPLETED. DETACH THIS TAB.
ENTER NAME OF FACILITY ACCORDING TO METHOD USED IN TELEPHONE DIREC-
TORIES. FOR LOCATION OF PLANT. SHOW CITY AND STATE IN WHICH PLANT TO
PRODUCE ITEMS DESIRED IS LOCATED. IF ANY SPACE ABOVE IS NOT SUFFICIENT,
ENTER ASTERISK (*) IN THAT SPACE AND CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE OF FORM.
IMPORTANT.—INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN SECTION IX,
ANNEX NO. 47, ALLOCATION OF PRIVATE INDUSTRIAL
CAPACITY FOR PROCUREMENT PLANNING OF THE ARMED
SERVICES, SHOULD BE FOLLOWED FOR THE COMPLETION
OF THIS FORM.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16— 64710'!
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to the Munitions Board for consideration.
3. Tentative Schedule of Production-
The 11Ghost Order 11
If the allocation of production is approved by
the Munitions Board, the board prepares Form 103, a Tent-
ative Schedule of Production (see Exhibit V) and forwards
this document to the plant management.
This schedule is not a binding order, but rather
a voluntary statement on the part of the firm that it be-
lieves that it can manufacture the products listed on the
schedule and can produce them in the time and volume needed.
4« Action by the Plant
It will be necessary for tne firm to study care-
fully its processes and conversion problems before deciding
that the schedule is reasonable and capable of attainmant.
The firm must also list all subcontractors and component
parts manufacturers necessary to meet the proposed schedule.
Subcontractors and component parts manufacturers should be
listed by name and address together with the products and
quantities required from them.
The firm is also requested to analyze the labor
force needed to meet the proposed schedule of production and
list the present force by shift and sex.
A study must be made to determine all raw materials
and/or basic processed material needed to meet both military
and civilian needs during an emergency and in what volume
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they will be needed. This data is, of course, an essential
part of the planning for industrial mobilization. This
information will assist in channelling material in time of
stress
.
Machine tools and other equipment needed to meet
civilian and military needs must also be determined and re-
corded. In addition, the unused productive capacity together
with the maximum production potential without plant expan-
sion must be determined in order to achieve maximum effective-
ness in allocation of capacity and to permit fullest util-
ization of present capacity.
To assist management in this detailed and diffi-
cult phase of planning
,
the form 103 gives a time schedule
of production from ”M Day”. It breaks the quantities
required for the first year down into quarters and the quan-
tities for the second year into halves, with a total for the
two years.
5. Legal Aspects of Schedule
When management decides that the schedule is rea-
sonable, they agree not to enter a binding contract, but
rather they agree that they are willing to enter into a
satisfactory contract with the proper authority for the
manufacture of the articles in the event of mobilization.
The tentative agreement terminates automatically on a pre-
determined date, after which date it will have no force
unless specifically renewed by mutual agreement. This date
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is usually twelve months from the date of issue, depending
entirely on the type of product, its obsolescense rate, and
the nature of the industry. This provision for automatic
lapse insures the periodic revision that is necessary for
an effective program.
At this point it is worthwhile to note how com-
pletely the whole program depends on the voluntary co-oper-
ation of industry. Without this vital co-operation the
whole program would be faced with almost insurmountable
obstacles. It is obvious that the government does little
more than point the way to industry by carrying out the
top level planning and evaluating the probable demands of
any future conflict. Basically the industrial mobilization
planning program is industry’s program.
.7
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CHAPTER VI
MANPOWER
1. Demands of Modern War
As has been stated before, modern war means total
war, affecting and making demands on all segments of our
economy. Victory has come to depend not only on the leader-
ship snd strategy of our military commanders and the caliber
of the men fighting under them, but also on the diligence,
the patriotism, the stamina, and the will to work of the
men and women on the home front.
Looking back into history, we may see that war
used to mean nothing more than sending out a small band of
armed men to grapple wTith the enemy while the rest of the
citizens carried on their usual activities in the customary
manner. Today, however, modern warfare strains the warring
nations to the limit, and in some cases beyond the limit,
of endurance.
Mobilization planning must face the manpower prob-
lems squarely as one of its most important tasks. The dy-
namic character of the problem makes it an unusually diffi-
cult one.
Technological changes in industrial processes and
methods as well as scientific strides in war weapons - both
will necessitate a constant reappraisal of manpower require-
ments. This reappraisal must consider not only the changes
in numbers of men, but also changes in methods of recruiting
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and training men.
Basically the question is one of deciding how
many men can be put into the Armed Forces and adequately
supplied without reducing the civilian economy and the
home front war effort to the danger point of ineffectiveness.
The problem embraces questions of methods of re-
cruiting men and women for military and industrial service,
controls to make the plans effective, means to make man-
power most effective and hold workers in essential jobs, and
an organization capable of administering the work.
2. High Employment Today
We are now in a period of high employment with
a resulting shortage of available labor, although full em-
ployment is desirable for a peacetime economy, such a con-
dition poses many knotty problems for mobilization planning.
Before World War II, sixteen percent of the labor
force was unemployed^, but as of December, 1948, only about
two percent of the labor force was not employed^-. Before
World War II, all basic industries were far below capac-
ity, but today all basic industries are close to their
peaks. For example, comparing the steel, petroleum, cement,
and electricity industries, we find the following results:
1. ”What T s Ahead for Industry If the Cold War Warms Up”,
Factory Management . July, 1948, p 66-71
2. ’’Current Labor Statistics”, Monthly Laoor rieview . Feb-
ruary, 1949, p 223
-.
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PERCENT BELOW CAPACITY PERCENT BELOW CAPACITY
BEFORE WORLD WAR II
1
DURING JULY. 1946 1
Steel 344 7%
Petroleum 21% 0%
Cement 46% 13%
Electricity 33% 2%
A reservoir of unemployed, as existed in 1939 &nd
1940* provides a cushion which absorbs much of the initial
impact of manpower mobilization efforts. If unemployment
were at a low point at the beginning of a war, a manpower
shortage would develop at the very outset, and immediate
controls would be necessary. We are now in such a danger-
ous period from the standpoint of mobilization demands.
3 . Manpower Requirements in Future War
It has been estimated that the United States
will need seventy-five million men and women to carry the
burden of any future war.^ This seventy-five million will
consist of fifteen million in uniform and sixty million in
a tightly controlled labor force - the entire organization
to be held together to fight a war lasting five years. 2
Such demands on our limited population would result
in an acute manpower shortage under any conditions and would
far exceed the capacities of those men of military age.
1. "What’s Ahead for Industry if the Cold War Warms Up",
Factory Management . July, 1943 > P 66-71.
2. R. M. Dobie, "We’d All Be Drafted for World War III", Bos -
ton Sunday Herald
.
Magazine Section, October 31, 1943, p 4-43
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We might very well be faced with the possibility
of being forced to find definite assignments for all who can
make a contribution to the war effort whether they be women,
old men, or even boys and girls, 1
We would probably be required to give our govern-
ment the power to assign all able bodied citizens from the
ages of eighteen to sixty-five to civilian employment re-
gardless of their individual desires (with the exception
of mothers of small children and the inmates of institu-
tions) as well as the power to allocate men between industry
and the Armed Forces, allocating civilian workers where
they will be most effective.
There are those who feel that technological devel-
opments and scientific conquests have reduced man’s place
in warfare to that of a bystander or a push-button tech-
nician, but the cruel fact is that every radically new
weapon in history has increased the size of armies.
4. Need For Controls
It would be sheer waste to allow skilled men to
enlist at will in the Armed Forces, and it would be folly
to allow specially trained workers to shift around from
industry to industry. Helter skelter enlistment can trans-
form a highly skilled mechanic, who is producing vital war
1. ’’Henry Cabot Lodge on Total War”, Boston Sunday Herald .
October 31, 1948.
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products in a period of labor scarcity, into an infantry
private whose highly developed skill is being lost digging
a foxhole and aiming a rifle.
Mot only on practical grounds should such controls
be granted, but also on moral grounds. It is difficult to
reconcile the power to force a man to serve in the Armed
Forces and risk his life in any theater of operations with
the government’s lack of ability to require civilian workers
to serve where they would be most effective. In the last
war the government’s power over civilian workers was in
large part negative.
The importance of a supporting organization of
supply to the man in the field has been pointed out many
times. ’’The man begind the man behind the gun” has been
glamorized by wartime propaganda, and his place in the
business of waging war has been rightly emphasized.
Mr. William Knudsen, later General knudsen,
pointed out that one man in the field requires the backing
of ten men at home . ^ Other estimates have gone as high as
seventeen men at home to every one man in combat.^
5. Experiences in Two World Wars
World War II was not a total war for the United
1. Address before the Military Order, Veterans of Foreign
Wars, Mew York City, April 1941*
2. Henry William Spreigel, The Economics of Total War (Mew
York, D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1942) , p 66
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States, but rather made only relatively moderate demands on
our economy. At the peak of the war effort in 1944* only
45% of the total labor force of the country served in the
Armed Forces or in war industries. Many luxury goods were
manufactured, and only partial controls were exercised.
Germany and England were faced with manpower
problems which more nearly approach the probable diffic-
ulties which might plague us in any future emergency. Both
of these countries found it necessary to employ dictatorial
methods of control in utilizing their manpower.
In May, 1940
,
Great Britain authorized the Min-
ister of Labor to conscript labor and authorized him to
"direct any person in the United Kingdom to perform such
services in the United Kingdom. . .which that person is, in
the opinion of the Minister, capable of performing."^
Germany had conscripted labor in 1939, long before
the outbreak of war. The authorities, under the powers
granted, could require the services of any resident from
the ages of fifteen to seventy years. 2
The United States, however, had a voluntary labor
force drawn only by motives of patriotism or inducements of
1. R. Magruder Dobie, "We’d All Be Drafted in World War III",
Boston Sunday Herald . Magazine Section, October 31, 1948,
p 4-48*
2. Henry William Spiegel, The Economics of Total War (D.
Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1942) p 153-157.
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a material sort. Absenteeism, a high turnover rate, and
high labor costs generally result from such a loose system.
Looking at our experiences in two world wars, we
can see the results of lack of planning on the vital prob-
lem of mobilization.
The entire mobilization program of World War I
was pure improvisation and a piece-meal patchwork affair
that merely developed as the need arose. Instead of exer-
cising effective control, the government, along with indus-
try, labored under a maze of restrictions.
There was a strain on the labor force in World
War I with a boom in going wage rates to attract the workers
from one industry to another. Wage differentials were upset
completely, so armies of workers, lured by high wages, made
their way to distant industrial cities. The large numbers
of men and women overtaxed all of the facilities of the
crowded sections of large cities. The conspicuous results
of the migration were poor housing, excessive labor turn-
over, and unusual labor shifting.
Looking at World War II, we see that men could
abandon critical jobs in critical plants to enter the Armed
Forces even though they were causing unreasonable ineffic-
iency and gross waste by their actions. The labor controls
that were imposed during World War II would be entirely
ineffective in an all-out war. High wages and draft defer-
ments for essential workers are questionable means for main-
-i
.
. .
taining a wartime work force.
6. The Problem
The problem is much more than one of facil-
itating the flow of workers from non-essential to essential
work; it also involves keeping them on essential work in
a manner which is most effective for our economy. Restric-
tions on mobility, as were employed in World War II, tend
merely to maintain the status quo and encourage employers
to keep workers for possible needs even wrhen they are not
able to make proper use of the services of all of the
workers
.
We must devise means whereby excessive turnover
and shifting can be eliminated and procedures for assigning
men where they will make their most valuable contribution
to the war effort. 1/Ve must give careful attention to
maintaining the efficiency of labor and improving workers’
morale. An active psychological campaign must be planned
to maintain the spirits of the working force, and plans
must be formulated for removing basic causes of unrest,
such as: inadequate housing, inadequate transportation facil-
ities, and lack of uniform wage scales. Finally, we must
devise means for effectively adjusting disputes and settling
grievances.
7. Labor Reserves
Our labor reserves at the moment are not limit-
less as some wishful thinkers might imagine, but rather
'.
.*1
-
4
-
v '
- - .
"
. .
J
-
. .. ..
59
they are very definitely in short supply compared to the
demands of an all out war.
Our reserves consist of the unemployed, the sub-
marginaily employed, those persons who would not ordinarily
accept employment, women, prisoners of war (after the war’s
beginning), the young, the aged, and foreign labor.
1
As of December, 194&> our reservoir of unem-
ployed was at an abnormally low figure of 1
,
9/^1
,
000^
,
so
this source does not provide a satisfactory reserve in
the immediate future at least.
It appears that the submarginaliy employed offer
the largest source of potential workers for tne war effort.
This source can be made available through the application of
proper policies. For example, it has been estimated that
5,000,000 men, low income single crop farmers, could be
drawn into industry from the land without sacrificing much
agricultural production because too many people are trying
to make an income from growing cotton and tobacco. 1
Women, children, and the aged constitute fifty
percent of our population, so they offer a very important
potential source of manpower. Industrial engineers have
here a challenging task in the service of their country of
1. Henry William Spreigel, The Economics of Total War, (Hew
York, D. Appelton-Century Co., Inc., 1942), p 69-75*
2. "Current Labor Statistics", Monthly Labor Review . Feb-
ruary, 194S, p 223.
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providing occupations for those of this group who are
available for work and are physically capable. Technol-
ogical advances, improved processes, and improved machinery
can provide jobs which are safe, easy to learn, pleasant,
and which do not require physical effort or strength.
Efforts should be directed toward developing
more and more labor saving devices in order to stretch
our limited supply of manpower. Science and research can
make an extremely important contribution to the war effort
by working along these lines now before their skills are
directed toward developing destructive forces in the heat
of battle.
Closely related to manpower problems are econ-
omic controls necessary to maintain a stable economy. Pub-
lic policies in wartime are usually designed to stabilize
wages, but stabilizing wages is tied up with the stabiliz-
ation of the cost of living and the necessary controls.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that increased
hours of work and increased effort can increase the product-
ivity of our working force up to a point, but this means
should be employed only as a temporary expedient or an emer-
gency measure
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CHAPTER VII
MATERIALS
1* The United States - A Have Hot Nation
It is almost trite to say that a war production
program is necessarily dependent on the smooth flow of mater
ials to wartime manufacturers; however, it is essential to
dispel the myth of the self-sufficiency of the United States
The United States is not self-sufficient for either peace
or war.
Two major wars in the past thirty years have cut
rather heavily into our supply of raw materials, and we are
rapidly becoming a have-not nation in respect to many natur-
al resources, and we have become dependent on countries all
over the world.
2. Favorable Aspects of Our Position
Looking at the favorable side of the problem, it
is true that the United States is better supplied with the
basic raw materials necessary for waging war than is any
other country. Our agricultural production is able to
supply the country with ample supplies of foodstuffs to
wage a war with the exception of coffee, spices, and cer-
tain tropical fruit.
1
Our country possesses ample supplies of cotton,
1. Allan Nevins and Louis M. Hacker, The Unitea States and
Its Place in World Affairs (Boston, D. C. Heath and Co.,
1943), p 535-543.
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more than one-half of the world’s known coal reserves, the
greater part of the Worth American iron ore deposits, which
comprise forty percent of the world’s total, and it produces
more than one-half of the world’s petroleum. ^ The United
States also has ready access to large deposits of copper,
lead, zinc, bauxite, and many other important materials.
1
3 . Proper Perspective
In spite of our reputed self-sufficiency, many of
our basic materials would be in short supply in any future
crisis. Petroleum, copper, rubber, and even steel and
aluminum would be needed in quantities far beyond the exist-
ing capacity of industry to supply. Imports are even now
becoming more and more important because of increasing de-
mand resulting from the present high level of business activ-
ity.
4* The Dependency of the United States
pfor Essential Materials
The materials discussed in the following section
are those regarded as essential to our economy and our
industrial life.
1. Allan Wevins and Louis M. Hacker, The United States and
Its Place in World Affairs (Boston, D. C. Heath and Co.,
1943), p 535-548.
2. Taken from undated pamphlet by Industrial College of the
Armed Forces, Appendix A - Charts and Maps . and lecture
on Critical and Strategic Materials
.
presented at Econom-
ic Mobilization Course at Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, on November 15, 1948.
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In the year 1944 the United States was entirely
self-sufficient in its supply of coal, iron ore, magnesium,
molybdenum, petroleum, phosphates, fluorspar, potash, sul-
phur, zinc, beef, dairy products, pork, textile fibers, fats
oils, and wheat. The United States is at least partially
dependent on outside sources for antimony, asbestos, baux-
ite, chromite, copper, graphite, industrial diamonds, lead,
manganese ore, mercury, mica splittings, nickel, platinum,
quartz crystals, tin, tungsten, vanadium, hard fibers, sugar
hides, and rubber.
The mere statement that we were dependent on
outside sources for certain materials is meaningless unless
we consider how far away those sources are and how heavily
we depend on them. Taking the year 1943 as an example, let
us consider how vulnerable we are in this respect.
In the year 1943 we imported roughly the follow-
ing percentages of our requirements:
ANTIMONY: 55% from Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru.
ASBESTOS: 98% from Canada (85%) and South Africa (15%)
.
BAUXITE, High Grade,: 22% from Surinam and British
Guiana.
CADMIUM: 1% from Belgium Congo and Peru.
COPPER: 30% from Chile, Mexico, Peru, Canada, Yugo-
slavia, and others.
INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS: 100% from South Africa, Belgium
Congo, the United Kingdom, and Brazil (20%)
.
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GRAPHITE: 7 5% from Mexico, Madagascar, and others.
KYANITE: 50% from India.
LEAD: 30% from Mexico, Australia, Peru, Africa, New-
foundland, Canada, and others.
MANGANESE: 85% from India, Brazil, the Gold Coast, Cuba
South Africa, Mexico, and others.
MANILA: 100% from Costa Rica, Canal Zone, Panama, Gua-
temala, and Honduras.
MERCURY: 50% from Mexico, Canada, Brazil, and others.
MICA: 25% from India, Canada, Brazil, and others.
NICKEL: 80% from Canada (72%), New Caledonia, and
Africa.
PEPPER: 100% from Mexico.
PETROLEUM: 5% from the Netherlands, East Indies, Ven-
zuela, Columbia, Mexico, and others.
PLATINUM: 75% from Canada, USSR, Columbia, and the
United Kingdom.
QUARTZ CRYSTALS: 99% from Brazil.
RUBBER: 15% from Ceylon, Liberia, Brazil, Mexico,.
Ecuador, the United Kingdom, Nicaragua, and others.
SHELLAC: 100% from India.
SUGAR: 70% from Cuba, Hawaii, Puerto Rica, and others.
TANTALITE: 98% from Brazil, Belgian Congo, Rhodesia,
Australia, and others.
TIN: 55% from Bolivia, Belgian Congo, and others.
TUNG OIL: 2% from Brazil.
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TUNGSTEN: 65$ from China, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil,
and others.
VANADIUM: 25$ from Peru, South Africa, and others.
WOOL: 55$ from Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, South
Africa, New Zealand, and others.
ZINC: 40$ from Mexico, Australia, Canada, Argentina,
Newfoundland, Peru, Belgian Congo, and Chile.
Although these figures are not absolutely correct
because they were estimated from bar charts, they do serve
a useful purpose of showing our dependency for vital raw
materials. The percentages show how much of each material
we require over and above domestic production plus domes-
tic secondary recovery. It is significant to note also
that the figures are representative of a wartime economy
and do not represent peacetime conditions. The year 1943
was chosen because the United States had then presumably
cultivated all domestic and nearby sources.
We depend rather heavily on outside sources for
manganese, a vital and irreplaceable element needed in the
manufacture of steel, for tin, which is needed to manu-
facture bearings, for rubber, which is needed for vehicles
and aircraft, and even for bauxite, the source of aluminum.
All of the domestic tin in 1943 was reclaimed,
and our present efforts to manufacture tin are wholly exper-
imental - the total supply being sufficient for less than
one month 1 s demand.
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Likewise, in 1943 most of the domestic antimony,
nickel, platinum, and rubber was reclaimed; as was one-
half of the domestic lead and much of the domestic zinc
and copper.
5. Classification of Materials -^-
Materials are usually classified as essential .
critical . and strategic with substantially the same meanings
assigned to each of the classifications regardless of what
source defines them.
Essential materials are those materials which are
ordinarily available from domestic sources in ample supply
for peacetime needs. However, wartime neeas for these ma-
terials might exceed supply and put them in the critical
or strategic category.
Critical materials are those which are essential
for a defense or war economy, but the procurement of which
would be somewhat less difficult than the procurement of
strategic materials either because they are less essential
or because they are available in greater quantity from
domestic sources. Some degree of conservation and some
degree of control over the distribution of these materials
would be needed. Aluminum, asbestos, cork, hides, wool,
and optical glass are typical examples of this category.
1. Harold J. Tobin and Percy W. Bidwell, Mobilizing Civilian
America (Hew York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1940) pl92-
.
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Strategic materials are those which are essential
to a defense or wartime economy and which are obtainable,
for the most part, from sources outside tne continental
limits of tne Unitea States, Strict conservation and rigid
control over distribution vrould be necessary. Typical
examples of this classification are rubber, silk, tin,
tungsten, chromium, and mica.
6. Plans of Action
There are only four possible plans of action to
insure adequate supplies of necessary materials.
First of all, it might be desirable to find alter-
native sources of supply which are less vulnerable to enemy
attack even though they might be more costly sources.
Secondly, it might be possible to develop or
stimulate domestic proauction.
Thirdly, it might be possible to discover sub-
stitute materials.
Finally, timely action to build up a stockpile
of materials might be necessary with strict conservation
measures exercised.
a. Alternative Sources
The vulnerability of supply routes is an impor-
tant factor to be considered in the supply of many of our
strategic materials. In peacetime, over half of the mercury
used in this country comes from Italy and Spain. Chrome
ore is imported from Africa. Most of our antimony, rubber.
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tin, tungsten, and manila fiber, as well as practically
all of our silk, and quinine come from the Far East.
The figures quoted as of 1943, showing tthe depen-
dency of the United States for certain materials reflected
a shift to safer sources wherever possible. In general,
the Western Hemisphere is considered a safer source for
strategic materials than the Far East, Europe, or Africa.
For example, the low grade tin produced by Bolivia
and the rubber produced by Brazil might be substituted to
some extent for the higher quality products of Malaysia.
Brazil and Cuba produce a ferromanganese ore which might
replace part of the supply now obtained from Russia and
India. Cuba is a more certain source of chrome ore than
is British Africa.
Nickel is in a class by itself because although
domestic primary production accounts for less than 5% of
our needs, most of our nickel comes from Canada, an almost
certain source.
b. Stimulating Domestic Production
Every effort should be directed at developing the
domestic production of manganese, chrome, tungsten, dye-
stuffs, by-products of coal, and all such raw materials
usually imported but which can be produced in quantity in
this country. Synthetic rubber can be utilized in peace-
time, and the industry should be assisted by the government
if necessary to insure the preservation of this wartime art.
. .
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The use of long range contracts or government subsidies
would assist in stimulating production of these materials.
Domestic substitutes should be discovered for
as many materials obtained abroad as possible, and every
effort made to utilize these substitutes in a peacetime
economy.
c. Stockpiling^
The objective of our stockpiling program is to
provide a stock of 67 strategic materials sufficient for
caring for the needs of a major war. The date set for
the completion of the program is 1951, but the progress
in the past makes the achievement of this goal seem very
doubtful.
As has been stated earlier, the Munitions Board
is charged with the responsibility of stockpiling materials
to the value of $3,154 billion in five years. Let us now
consider how this goal compares with our accomplishments
as of April, 1948.
1951 Goal: Stockpile of critical
materials worth $3,154*000 > 000.
Less: Value of items on hand
from war stockpile 31,000,000.
1. From ’’Build the Stockpile how for National Security”,
Factory Management
. April, 1948, pp 50-55. Also ”What
Are We Doing how about hational Security?”, Factory
Management . March, 1948, pp 66-73.
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Less: Value of surplus property-
acquisitions to be worth 4 316.000,000.
Total to be purchased over
five year period $2.757.000. 000.
With a total goal of $2,757,000,000 worth of
materials to be purchased, the Munitions Board must pur-
chase $550,000,000 annually to meet the goal. However,
in 1947 ^d 1948 together . only $278 million were approp-
riated for stockpiling. For 1949 $435 million was reques-
ted, but as of April, 1948, the figure nan been reduced to
$285 million.
One does not have to search very far to find
statistics put forth to prove that our stockpiling program
is well along and that we have acquired up to 25% of total
requirements already. Such wishful thinkers are swayed by
the initial effect of materials left over from tne last
war on the end goal.
The fact of the matter, as showed by the preceed-
ing section, is that we are far behind our schedule of pur-
chases. We have to step up progress, increase purchases, and
remove certain restrictions hindering the program. One
major impediment is the restriction that stockpilers may
buy only what United States industry does not want of these
scarce materials, and these amounts are too small. The
restriction to year to year appropriations and to one year
contracts also hampers any efforts to stimulate long-term
mining developments.
« '
-
-
bL s».
. .
--
. C<* N
.
71
We need a long-range program in all phases with
sufficient authority in the hands of the responsible agency
to get the job aone. We should explore the possible util-
ization of marginal resources in the United States through
government supported scientific research. Tax incentives
might be offered to induce venture capital to undertake
such ventures. Above all, we should increase appropriations
and catch up on purchases.
*.
.
CHAPTER VIII
EXAMPLE OF MATERIAL STUDY
1. Study of Ferrous Scrap
In order to better understand the type of approach
used by the Rational Security Resources Board in attacking
the broad problems facing it, let us consider a report sub-
mitted on July 1, 194-3, by Mr. R. J. lysor, special assist-
ant to Mr. A. M. Hill, Chairman, on the subject of ferrous
scrap.
In spite of the common opinion to the contrary,
there exists in the United States an acute shortage of
ferrous scrap, and this shortage seems to be growing worse.
Since this scrap is essential for the production of steel
and also in the iron foundry business, the shortage assumes
special significance. This scrap is needed for production
in the blast furnace, the Bessemer converter, the foundry
hearth type furnace, the electric steel furnace, the foundry
cupola, and above all in the open hearth steel furnace.
2. Causes of Shortage of Ferrous Scrap
The existing shortage has its roots in the past,
having been caused by several factors. From 1933 to 1941
>
very heavy exports of scrap were made, aggregrating about
twenty-one million tons, roughly more than nine times as
much as was exported in the preceeding nine year period.
From 1941 to 1945 approximately one hundred
twenty-four million tons of iron or steel goods were
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shipped abroad in finished form, and the prospects of this
metal returning to this country in any form are very remote.
Electric steel melting furnaces were aided in
their expansion efforts during World Wfar II so greatly that
they quadrupled their capacity. These furnaces use one
hundred percent scrap in the raw charge and use a very
high quality scrap. Cupolas have also expanded their cap-
acity in the past decade, creating greater and greater
demands on a dwindling supply of scrap because they use
a charge of two-thirds scrap.
On the other hand, the Bessemer process, a light
user of scrap, has declined in importance, accounting for
seventy percent of the United States steel production in
1900, but only five or six percent in 1948.
Another important factor in the growing scrap
shortage is the turnover, that is the time it takes for a
new product to find its wTay to the scrap heap. The turn-
over rate has been declining markedly. Immense bridges,
office buildings with steel frames, and tunnel frames are
examples of steel with a low turnover rate because of the
indefinite life of such structures.
Even finished goods with quicker turnover rates
will yield much less scrap than formerly because of the
fact that goods manufactured during the shortage have been
made with less steel, having the lowest practicable steel
content. Then too, the installation of many strip mills
&, ,
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in the last two decades has made the steel scrap physically
lighter.
With current scrap inventories lower than they
have been at any time since records were started in 1939,
mobilization planners have a real problem here. In the
event of an emergency in the near future, this situation
would be intensified because of the increased demand and be-
cause of the fact that many companies, during the retooling
period, would be accumulating the raw material steel to
fabricate but would not be producing scrap for the steel
producers.
It is obvious that some sort of action is needed
to rectify such a situation. We know that weapons of war
in the past have been fashioned in large part from steel,
and it is very likely that the same situation will hola
true in any future conflict, at least in the immediate
future.
3. Possible Courses of Action
We could import scrap steel from Germany since
this country has large stocks of war-created scrap. This
asset of our former enemy is being regarded with covetous
eyes by the industrially minded Russians, ana the loss of
such a treasure would be a serious blow to the United States.
Belgium and Luxembourg have scrap for exportation because
of their large Bessemer production. It is significant to
note that the Department of Commerce is currently working
.
on this problem to stimulate importation.
Reclamation of the scrap from the islands of the
Pacific is worthy of consideration, but this source would
be slow and costly to exploit. Our own country could be
combed for possible sources, salvage operations intensi-
fied, and the wastes from oxidation in the processes could
be reduced. Possibly the percent of scrap in the charge
could be reduced, through research, in oraer to ease the
demand for scrap.
Possibly one of the most important questions
answered by Mr. Wysor’s report is whether or not we should
build up a strategic scrap stockpile, decentralizing its
location near the large centers of steel production to be
released in case of a national emergency. Other vital
metals are being accumulated in this manner, and much could
be said in favor of such a step. One might expect mobil-
ization planners to heartily endorse such a program for
national defense, extolling the virtues of playing safe
and painting the dire consequences of an inadequate supply.
However, this report did not recommend building
up a stockpile of ferrous scrap at this time. The cost,
for one thing, would be a very sizeable amount. It would
cost 1520,000,000 for a six month’s supply, not including
charges for handling, storage, carrying expenses, or depre-
ciation.
The author of the report felt that one of our
.,
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greatest assets in meeting the demands of a situation such
as this one is the genius, resourcefulness, initiative, and
energy of the men in charge of our nation 1 s affairs and
industry. These men can cope with the unpredictable real-
ities of life and could come up with the answer to any
difficulties which might arise.
4* Recommendations
We should profit from our mistakes in the past
and never again export such large amounts of scrap to the
point of weakening our position and should attempt to
relieve the demands on our scrap piles through scientific
research. If any accumulation of scrap is to be made, it
should wait until our current production of steel drops off
from near capacity production to a more normal pace. At
such a time scrap will be available, and the cost will be
lower
.
Mr. Wysor recommended conferring with industry
on the problems of stockpiling, ferrous exports, the rela-
tionship among iron ore, pig iron, ana scrap, as well as on
any other problems which might arise.
5. Reasons for Considering This Study
This study has been considered to show the method
of approach used by the National Security Resources Board
in analyzing its problems. The men doing this work are
not starry eyed idealists grasping for the ideal condition
of absolute preparedness at all times. They realize the
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difficulties of even defining the word "preparedness" and
the even greater difficulties of attaining the goal. They
are not control-minded men who believe in slapping absolute
government controls on our economy to have everyone do what
is right for the country, with right determined by the plan-
ners.
Industrial mobilization planning is being carried
on by men who are conscious of the fact that the economy
must continue its normal path and not be dammed up for the
sake of a minor objective. They are men who are realistic
and practical writh mature jedgement.
What is more, as w-as demonstrated by the recommend-
ation that the National Security Resources Board confer with
industrial leaders on the problems of ferrous scrap, these
men realize the importance of private enterprise in this
entire program and the value of the contribution that
industry can make.
.-
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CHAPTER K
STRATEGIC RELQCATION 1
The National Security Act of 194? charges the
National Security Resources Board with "the strategic
relocation of industries, services, government, and econ-
omic activities, the continuous operation of which is essen-
tial to the nation’s security." This problem of relocation
is a very difficult one to cope with, depending for its
solution on both the government and industry.
1. Motives for Relocation
Industry should have two motives for dispersion
of its facilities: the security of the nation and the very
existence of industry. Industry and the government must
work together as a team to arrive at a mutually satis-
factory solution.
The civilian of today is often terrified by the
possible weapons of large scale destruction and terror which
might be used in any future struggle, but at the same time
he is lulled into a feeling of security by our possession of
an atomic bomb stockpile. Possible there is a middle
ground of reality.
1. Taken from an article by the National Security Resources
Board, National Security Factors in Industrial Location
(Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office,
September, 1948) and a release to morning papers, Sept-
ember 30, 1943, by the N. S. R. B.
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2. Goal of Relocation Efforts
The purpose of relocation planning is not to
effect an immediate or even a short range rearrangement of
our industrial machinery, but rather to lay out long range
goals. This is another selling assignment for the indus-
trial mobilization planners - an assignment to sell indus-
try on the need for locating plants according to strategic
considerations in addition to the usual factors governing
location problems, to cause industrial leaders to think in
terms of strategic considerations in any future expansion
plans, and to drive home to industry the importance of
recognizing the emergency which faces the United States
along these lines.
Twelve to fourteen billions of dollars are being
spent each year for new plants and equipment. A major
portion of this expansion is oeing carried out in areas
which are already too highly concentrated from the stand-
point of strategic considerations.
3. Meed for Dispersion
Location alone has ceased to be a protection from
attack because of the rapid development of modern aircraft
and atomic weapons. There is no known military defense
against the atomic bomb except dispersion.
If dispersion is the only effective defense against
the atomic bomb, think how extremely vulnerable are our
concentrated industrial areas, and think also what a stagger-
.. .
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ing blow could be delivered by a sneak attack or by sabotage
employing atomic explosives. Since the atomic bomb appears
to offer the greatest threat, let us consider some of the
problems of atomic warfare.
4. The Threat of Atomic Weapons
In the first place, atom bombs are very costly,
and the essential elements of uranium and plutonium are
scarce materials. In addition, delivering the bombs to
the target offers two more factors: the expense of deliv-
ery and the vulnerability of aircraft in long range flights,
probably without escort.
The staggering costs and the problems of delivery
will probably mean that no country will ever be able to
afford to drop an atomic bomb on any city of 50,000 people
or less, or on a congested industrial area of less than
five square miles. Since the atomic bomb destroys almost
everything within a radius of one-half mile from the point
of impact, inflicting moderate structural damage for an
additional one and one-half miles, only large, congested
industrial areas would be logical targets. Sven with improve-
ments in the weapon, it is not believed that the bomb would
cause heavy damage beyond three miles from the center.
5. Importance of Relocation efforts
Taking the aforementioned factors into consid-
eration, the problem of relocation of industry becomes
increasingly important, with two obvious steps suggested
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at once: locate in the smaller cities and disperse facil-
ities as much as possible - more than three miles apart.
We assume that any future attack upon our country
would be made without warning, that it would be an attack
of great magnitude, and that it would be aimed at crip-
pling industrial capacity. Geographical location and dis-
tance from the enemy offers little protection because of
modern developments, but space and dispersion do offer
protection.
Efforts toward relocation might well be one of
the most important contributions which industry can make
to long range mobilization planning. Industrial leaders
should evaluate present facilities in the light of any
possible future attack. Tney should look beyond tneir own
plant and see if there are any nearby industries which are
potential targets.
6. Possible Points of Attack
Vve merely have to refer to the typical factors
which governed our selection of strategic targets in the
last war to see what type of targets any potential enemy
might attack in this country. Any plant, large or small,
producing a critical item upon which other production might
depend could be a logical aiming point of an atomic attack
against an industrial section. A highly explosive or
inflammable target might be selected to intensify the damage
Public utilities, such as power plants and water systems.
J
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might well be attacked to cripple an industrial section.
Dams, bridges, airbases, supply centers, marsheling yards.
Armed Forces installations - all might well be chosen as
the point of impact.
Such an understanding on the part of industrial
leaders might reveal that a particular plant, while not
actually a highly critical facility, might be within a three
mile radius of some critical facility or other potential
target and thus be highly vulnerable. This fact should
temper the decision of management to expand or replace
present facilities.
7. Industry’ s Part
What should industry do about the problem, and
where does industry fit into the picture? To begin with,
management should add strategic factors to its list of econ-
omic factors governing plant location. All future planning
should give this factor a very heavy weight because it
might well be a decisive factor in any future war. ho one
will question the fact that dispersed targets offer many
headaches to an attacking force. Knowing this fact, let
us benefit by the knowledge and start dispersing our facil-
ities, maximizing the difficulties of an attack.
In conclusion, the problem of relocation is a
most important one and also a long range one. With the
annual rate of industrial building at an estimated twelve
or fourteen billions of dollars, it is evident that aisper-
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sion can be carried on through normal expansion and replace-
ment activities. It is not to be expected that industry
will immediately start to move present facilities to rural
areas, but it is to be hoped that industry will give ser-
ious thought to the matter of strategic relocation.
8. Example of Relocation 1
The Brake Shoe Company has just completed its
program of decentralization at a cost of $15,000,000 with
the opening of its new brass works at Meadville, Pennsyl-
vania.
This company, now consisting of sixty plants
located in forty communities, has relocated in small town
sites for many reasons, one of which was the desire to
comply with the government’s request for decentralization for
national defense reasons.
Other reasons for the program, reasons wliich are
also advantages which might well be realized by other firms,
were the desire to provide better working conditions for
employees, the program to reduce costs, and an attempt to
improve organization and control.
Employees benefitted from the improved living con-
ditions in the new locations, from better facilities in the
new plants, and from the installation of new safety devices.
1. ’’Brake Shoe Opens hew Brass Works”, hew York Times
. Octo-
ber 21, 194^, p 41, column 1.
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Costs were reduced through the use of improved
construction materials, the abandonment of obsolete equip-
ment, the superior production engineering made possible,
the improved process engineering which was employed, the
improvements in routing made possible, and the careful plan-
ning made before each move.
The company was also able to concentrate its ef-
forts on related products by planned decentralization and
provide adequately for future expansion.
Although national defense considerations were
probably only very slightly influential in causing this
company to embark on this active program of decentralization
at least they were considerations.
The advantages derived from the program of decen-
tralization within the organization itself should be given
very careful consideration by every company when it consid-
ers the questions arising from the problem of strategic
relocation. Both the government and the individual firm
have much to gain from such a program, and both patriotic
and selfish motives may be satisfied in this case.
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CHAPTER X
FACILITIES
1. Our Past Record of Armament Programs
Concerning the armament programs of the United
States, Arthur Stone Dewing once wrote1
,
"Corporations the
country over added buildings, plants, even whole groups of
plants, to produce munitions and equipment needed in a
hectic race to build, in a brief period of time, a defense
armament which should have been constructed over a period
of years."
Describing the post war period, he continued,
"Buildings and machinery will lie idle and decay until
another international crisis has started another hectic
race for rearmament."
These words certainly describe our past confused
efforts to fight a war. We would go through this pattern
again and again if no one gave any thought to the necessity
of planning for emergencies. At least we would go through
the cycle of abandonment and preparation once more if we
were to become involved in another war, but the second cycle
would not be possible if we were to suffer the very likely
defeat that could result from unpreparedness. Two words
1. Arthur Stone Dewing, The Financial Policies of Corpora-
tions
.
(New York, The Ronald Press Co., 1941J7 Book III,
Chapter 3, pp 625-626.
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adequately describe this type of action: confusion and
waste.
In past wars, the inadequacy of our industrial
capacity to meet wartime needs and the frenzied efforts to
increase capacity in most industries have caused no serious
embarrassment to us because of the protective element of
sufficient time to prepare.
Industry has been able to expand output under
the stimulus of war with the emphasis on output and only
secondarily on efficiency. Funds have been made avail-
able in the past by preventing the investment of private
capital in non-essential industries, thus diverting this
venture capital to the war producing industries, and also
by making public funds available.
2. Problems of Conversion
During a period of emergency or war, the problems
of conversion vary widely among the various industries nec-
essary for the conduct of war or defense. There are many
basic industries, such as steel, power, and transportation,
that can merely continue their operations on an expanded
scale. Their problem is one of achieving maximum produc-
tion.
Other important industries, such as the electric-
al and communications equipment industries, turn out the
same type of goods witn certain changes in design to meet
military needs. Their problem is one of partial conversion.
-.
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While some firms are faced with few problems on
this matter of conversion, many of our largest facilities
have to be almost completely converted from civilian to
military production. The peacetime line is either re-
stricted to a small percentage of normal production or
eliminated entirely.
3. The Munitions Industry
The munitions industry is in a category by itself.
This industry must spring from an almost insignificant base
in peacetime to an industry of tremendous importance in a
war time economy. The United States has no great private
firms, such as the Vickers in England, Shneider-Creusot in
France, and Krupp in Germany, whose principle activity even
in times of peace is the manufacture of cannon, shells,
small arms, and other war materials.
The growth of the munitions industry in the past
fits into Mr. Dewing’ s description of hectic expansion and
then post war decay. This growth and decline appears to be
not only a very costly indulgence which we have allowed our-
selves in the past, but also an extremely time consuming one.
The nature of the munitions industry is such that it could
very well be a very weak point in our preparedness program.
In a peacetime economy, without guidance from the
government, private industry would place its entire attention
on its primary job of producing for peacetime needs. Plant
layouts, new buildings, and new locations would be influenced
.
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entirely by peacetime considerations. It is for this reason
that the government must bear the burden of insuring that
we have adequate facilities for war production.
4* Plants Built During World War II
During World War II billions of dollars were
spent to build specialized munitions plants, and it might
well be asked what has become of these plants and how they
might be used in any future emergency.
Some of these plants were not easily sold to
private management or were of sufficient importance to our
national security to be retained, so today tha National Mil-
itary Establishment is retaining one hundred fifty-one com-
plete plants in use or in standby readiness.
1
Those plants which were readily saleable to pri-
vate management were preserved by the use of a national
security clause, included in the sale contract, providing
that the plant will in no way be altered to interfere with
its reconversion for the production of the goods for which
it was designed and built. Two hundred forty-two plants are
thus being held in readiness.!
5. Goal of Planning for Facilities
The purpose of planning for industrial mobiliz-
ation is to maintain a state of maximum preparedness at
1. S. E. Reimel and E. R. Henning, Survey of Machine Tool
Requirements and Resources (Washington, D. C., The Nation-
al Security Resources Board, September 7, 1948), p 4»
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minimum expense and to minimize the costs of conversion.
The agencies working for this goal are also attempting to
minimize any new construction that will be required in the
event of war.
The United States should have a pool of essential
and strategic plants maintained in a state of readiness to
be made available for national defense and war production
in the event of another emergency. The principle of stock-
piling should be extended to include productive capacity.
i. .
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CHAPTER XI
MACHINE TOOLS
1. A Potential Bottleneck
It is difficult for most people to appreciate
the full importance of the machine tool industry in time
of mobilization and war production, but the availability
of machine tools can determine the production potential
of this country. In World War II, the greatest bottleneck
was the machine tool industry, and the cruel lessons taught
at that time are not to be forgotten so soon.
As has been stated earlier, the Munitions Board
is charged with setting aside machine tools worth $500
million as a vital part of industrial mobilization planning,
while the National Security Resources Board is responsible
for the broader aspects of the problem: that of formulating
policies regarding building up reserves of and conservation
of the nation 1 s materiel, and that of dealing with problems
of control over the materiel.
2. Reaction of the Industry to the Business Cycle
The machine tool industry is a classical example
of a producer-goods industry that is subject to very violent
swings with the cyclical changes in our economy. This
sensitivity to business conditions makes over-expansion a
very serious threat to the economic welfare of the industry
and should be worthy of very careful consideration from
mobilization planners.
..
:
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This characteristic of the industry would make
expansion during war time a purely patriotic act on the
part of the industry if the government did not recognize
the problem and do something about it. One solution is
to permit rapid amortization of plant and equipment during
periods of national emergency in order to maintain a heal-
thy and active industry.
3. A Study by the National Security Resources Board
S. E. Reimel and E. R. Henning made a study of
machine tool requirements and resources for Arthur M. Hill,
chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and
submitted on September 7, 1948, a report entitled Survey
of Machine Tool Requirements and Resources . Since this
type of survey is characteristic of the methodical approach
to the various problems of mobilization planning, a digest
of their findings and recommendations follows.
This study deals with the following tools:
Machine tool attachments and accessories,
Guages and machinists’ precision measuring
tools,
Abrasive products.
Cutting tools.
Cranes and hoists.
Foundry equipment and supplies.
Metal melting furnaces.
Light power driven tools.
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Portable electric and pneumatic tools.
Mechanics’ hand service tools, and
Chains.
The survey treats the problem of machine tools in
its broad aspects as one dealing with the current capacity
of the industry, the stockpiling of machine tools, plans
for achieving full output in the machine tool industry, and
detailed plans of distributing machine tools.
Considering the current capacity and plans for
achieving full output, they discovered that the machine
tool industry was, in 1948, working at a level as high as
could be expected in time of peace with a yearly output of
$30,000,000. However, the industry could promptly double
its existing production still using one shift working forty
hours a week without requiring any substantial amounts of
tools to attain full war capacity. Reserve plants are
being maintained in a satisfactory state of readiness to
further augment production if needed.
Present reserves of 90,000 tools are available to
bridge the gap, at least in part, between early requirements
for tools and the attainment by the machine tool industry of
full wartime required output.
For the rapid distribution of reserve tools in
case of emergency, plans are now being prepared for a cen-
tral control agency to permit rapid identification and loca-
tion of reserve tools, and shipment to production facilities.
..
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These investigators recommended that reserve tools
should be used to the utmost in the current rearmament pro-
gram to serve as a check on the condition of the tools and
to assure a greater degree of readiness by actually going
through the procedures. The reserve stocks of accessory
equipment, such as cutting tools, and guages, should be used
for the same reasons.
They also recommended that the channels of auth-
ority be set up now to avoid duplication of effort and to
have a smoothly running organization when the neea arises.
It is apparently difficult to determine where the functions
of the National Security Resources Board end and the functions
of the Munitions Board begin.
The most heartening part of the report is the fact
that pool orders for machine tools, totaling 100,000, are
being prepared now, contingent upon an emergency. Each
selected tool builder will have in his possession his
assigned order before the emergency arises, so the whole
industry will be able to get going without waiting for any
further orders. These so-called n phantom order s" are being
placed through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
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CHAPTER XII
IMPORTANCE OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION
PLANNING TO PRIVATE INDUSTRY
1. Scope of Planning Efforts
In its very scope industrial mobilization plan-
ning is of very great importance to industry. The Munitions
Board expects to survey some 22,000 to 25,000 plants in the
United States, representing about 90$> of the productive cap-
acity of the country1
,
and, according to T. H. Hargrave,
Chairman of the Munitions Board, 82,000 industrial plants
are of interest to the military forces for planning pur-
poses .
2. Voluntary Role of Private Enterprise
United States industry has a vital part in the
planning for mobilization, and its role is an entirely vol-
untary one. It is necessary that the job of carrying out
the program falls on the shoulders of industry because
industry has the know-how of design, development, tooling,
production, and planning plus that elusive ability known
as technique.
It is up to industry to develop complete company
plans for war operations, to determine necessary additional
facilities, manpower, tools, and material to carry out
1. Eleanor Roberts, "Industry is Ready for Any War Crisis",
Boston Sunday Post
.
October 31, 1943.
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planned production. Industry must establish pilot lines
of production tools, if necessary, and make certain advan-
ce plans with subcontractors. Only the individual managers
can lay out detailed plans of orders to be cancelled, mater-
ials to be purchased, manpower to be procured, and equip-
ment to be rearranged in case of emergency. The success of
the entire program rests on the willingness of private
enterprise to meet this responsibility.
3. Selfish Interest in Program
In many respects, industry has a selfish interest
in co-operating with industrial mobilization planners.
Obviously, if a company co-operates in carrying out plant
surveys and in working out tentative production schedules,
it will be producing those products for which it will be
best fitted, thus retaining peacetime production skills,
and it will also gain an opportunity to do its best work.
Industry has much at stake in any future war,
considering both its patriotic motives and its selfish inter-
ests. Should we be attacked in the future, without warning
and consequently without precious time to mobilize as we
have in the past, only carefully laid plans swiftly ex-
ecuted would save us from destruction and defeat.
Conditions are such that any individual firm
refusing to co-operate in planning for mobilization would
be in an extremely vulnerable position to say the least.
If a company were unprepared when the unexpected blow was
%
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struck, it would be unable to participate in the initial
phase of mobilization and might see its raw materials and
labor force drained away. Then the company would have to
sit idly by, suffering losses, until the initial burst of
mobilization passed. Finally, this company might be
assigned a product for which it would be only partially
suited to produce and might be able to operate at only
partial capacity for a prolonged period.
The innumerable possibilities of a situation of
this sort might well cause serious thought on the part of
any firm not aware of the implications of indifference.
The government’s evaluation of foreign potential
to wage war, including atomic •warfare, biological warfare,
and sabotage, provides industry with vital information
required for possible defense measures. The study of re-
location and dispersal problems, underground activities,
camouflage, dummy installations, and false records to
confuse the enemy intelligence - all of these studies by
the government bear directly on industrial problems in time
of war.
4« Interest of Small Concerns in Planning
Even the smaller plants in the United States have
an important stake in planning for industrial mobilization
because the government is seeking widest practicable geo-
graphical dispersion of the war load with no set minimum
limit as to the size of facilities. Multiple sources of
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identical items will be sought.
Pressure will probably be brought to avoid over-
concentrating business with certain strong companies by
permitting losing companies to remain in the picture even
though their bids might be slightly higher than their larger
competitors’. To disperse tne load of wartime production
as much as possible, non-congested areas and small cities
will be combed for suitable plants for war time work.
Government support will probably be necessary
in certain special cases to prevent certain war time arts,
such as the adhesion of rubber to steel in the manufacture
of tanks, from becoming extinct.
The larger companies, of course, will have to
carry the largest share of the war load because of their
large capacity, their efficiency of operation, and the
relative ease of conversion made possible by their know how.
5. Internal Planning needed
Every plant should give careful thought to the
idea of formulating its own plans for mobilization. The
task of planning is not an easy one, but rather a very diffi-
cult one indeed. It is difficult to determine exactly what
type of products each plant will make; it is impossible to
estimate accurately what future costs will be in production;
and the whole job of planning consumes time and money.
Nevertheless, each plant should consider the
advisability of setting up a permanent organization for
.-
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industrial mobilization with a major executive in charge.
There should be an operating director of planning to contact
the government planning agencies and to gather the informa-
tion from subordinate officials. Perhaps the director should
have a staff to assist him with the problems of planning,
having subofficials also acting as representatives of the
internal organization for industrial mobilization planning.
Those executives responsible for planning should
be familiar with the internal operations of the plant as
well as any particular problems of their company or industry.
They should be familiar with special problems that arose
during World War II, and, above all, they should under-
stand the over all objectives of industrial mobilization
planning
.
In spite of the difficulties and cost involved,
each plant should formulate its own plans for M Day and
should keep these plans up-to-date. The initial survey
will be difficult for any plant if properly conducted, but
keeping the plan current will present fewer problems.
.
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CHAPTER XIII
EXAMPLE OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PLARRIES
BY KQPPERS COMPANY IEC. 1
The Koppers Co., Inc. of Pittsburgh, Pennsyl-
vania, has just completed its initial phase of industrial
mobilization planning and is now preparing its record of
allocations, tentative production orders, ana otner detailed
plans which will be executed on M Day.
1. Type of Operations
This company designs and constructs by-product
coke plants, chemical plants, and other structures; it
operates coke plants and blast furnaces; it produces coal
tar products, chemicals, shop and foundry products, piston
rings, and treated forest products.
The wide range of products and the very size of
this concern makes it an excellent subject for study. The
planning embraces six operating divisions and fifty-three
individual plants.
2. Objectives of Planning Efforts
The Koppers Company recognizes the full impor-
tance of industrial mobilization planning to our economy
and to our way of life, so it has set up three primary
objectives in the preparation of company plans.
1. Taken from Industrial Mobilization Plan . Sections 1 & 2
(Pittsburg, Koppers Co., Inc., 194^)
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The first is to aid in preventing a third world
war through achieving industrial preparedness by deter-
mining the industrial potential of each individual plant,
of each division, and of the company as a whole.
The second objective is to keep this data up t.o
date by frequent revision, revising at least once a year or
more often if necessary. They rightfully feel that the
data is of no real value unless it is kept current.
The third primary objective is to be prepared at
all times to supply prompt and accurate information to the
Munitions Board and to the Armed Forces. They thus ex-
pressly state their willingness to co-operate with the
government in this vital work.
The company also endeavors to give all levels of
management an opportunity to take stock of plant equipment
and processes and an opportunity to analyze all present and
future products that the company can make,
3. Internal Organization for Mobilization Planning
The Koppers Company has riot only appointed an
industrial mobilization director, who co-operates with
the Armed Forces and the government in the allocation of
plant capacity for the production of munitions, but also
maintains an organization for industrial mobilization plan-
ning within the company 1 s regular organization.
Feeling that a third world war appears to be
inevitable but that timely and adequate preparedness can
J it
*<aJ
.
.
*
-
•
.. -J
. .
.
• •
'
-
• •
.
•
“
.* . .
.y :
. u
101
assist greatly in preventing it, this company believes that
industry is just as responsible for preparedness as are the
military forces. They believe that industry must deter-
mine its potential at once so that the requirements of the
Armed Forces and tne civilian economy can be compared with
our capacity to produce, in order tnat strategy and tactics
may be tempered by this knowledge.
Only by knowing the detailed potential of each
individual plant can we accurately see the composite pic-
ture and visualize the country’s over-all potential. The
country wall benefit through the tremendous saving in time
should there be another war, and each individual firm will
benefit from an opportunity to take stock of present equip-
ment and to consider all of the various products which it
is capable of producing.
The organization for industrial mobilization
planning within the company consists of the president acting
as the director of the planning, the production manager as
the over-all representative, the division managers as the
representatives for their divisions, and the plant managers
acting as the representatives for their plants. Each indiv-
idual is also familiar with the broader aspects of indus-
trial mobilization planning. This organization recog-
nizes the fact that industrial mobilization planning in
almost any company is primarily a production and an engin-
eering problem which needs recognition at the very top
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levels of management.
Planning for mobilization covers all manufac-
turing, engineering, and research activities of this
company, plant by plant, division by division, and finally
for the company as a ’whole. It considers the need for
key management officials, scientifically trained men, and
general 'workers, for normal and maximum operations.
4 . Procedure for Survey
The over-all procedure is for each plant super-
intendent to determine his own industrial potential, for
each division manager to make a summation and evaluation
of the reports of the plants, and finally for the produc-
tion manager to compile a description of the whole company,
its products, and its personnel.
One month was allowed for the fifty-three plants
to make their returns; one month was allowed for the div-
isions to complete their work; and one month vms allowed for
the composite plan to be completed. Thus, a total of three
months was all that was required for this large company
to make an evaluation of its industrial potential. A rev-
ision was to have been started on December 1, 1948, with
the same timetable.
The following sections will indicate the detailed
studies made the company over by the Koppers organization
on its own initiative and at its own expense.
'*
.
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a. Individual Plant Survey
Each plant was required to furnish a detailed
report on all of its activities, its organization, and its
facilities
.
The report stated the Division, the name of the
plant, the location, and the name of the manager. It
included a chart of the organization of trie plant, showing
the key personnel, listing the scientifically trained per-
sonnel with their degrees and principal fields of activity.
It also contained a thumbnail sketch of principal depart-
ment heads and other key personnel, indicating those who
could be replaced only with great difficulty.
The personnel of the plant were tabulated and
listed by male or female, hourly or salaried, and the percent
of skilled workers was indicated.
An analysis was made of principal materials:
raw materials for production, supplies, fuel, ana main-
tenance and repair materials to show the amounts required
for normal and maximum operation.
The principal products were tabulated, showing
the amounts produced under normal operating conditions, writh
a forty hour, five day week (unless operated continuously)
,
and also under maximum operating conditions. Wherever pos-
sible, these figures were expressed quantitatively; other-
wise, in sales dollars. The number of shifts then being
worked and the hours per shift by principal departments were
..
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listed.
It was necessary to make a comprehensive plant
layout print showing for each building the following infor-
mation: an identifying number, the type of construction,
the number of floor levels, the building area in square
feet, the percentage of the area then used in production,
and the percentage then being used in warehousing.
The type of fire protection was analyzed, list-
ing both major and auxiliary equipment available in the
plant as well as organized community apparatus available.
Other types of security measures, such as police guard
or fencing were indicated.
The report included power, both internal and
external. The power received from sources outside of the
plant was considered according to the kind of power and its
source, according to standby and emergency arrangements,
and according to the sufficiency of feeders, generators,
transformers, and the distribution system to permit max-
imum operation in all departments of the plant.
If power was generated within the plant, the
unit generating capacities and the fuel used were studied.
Emergency substitutes were considered, and the ability of
the system to care for maximum needs was also considered.
A listing was made of all principal items of pro-
duction equipment, regardless of how extensive the list was.
The list covered such items as: melting and heat treating
..
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furnaces, stills, storage tanks, columns, forging presses,
forging machines, special machinery, and machine tools.
The purchase dates of all equipment together with the
present condition of the machinery accompanied the inven-
tory.
A study was made of the toolroom, machine shop,
and employee service room facilities to determine if they
were adequate for maximum operation. The plant gage and
instrument checking facilities were evaluated as well as
shipping facilities. Material handling methods were
described and the condition of the equipment indicated.
Shipping facilities available were evaluated and described.
Personnel factors entered into this comprehen-
sive study. If the plant was then unionized, the name of
the union was to be given. Any wage systems in effect
were described briefly.
A description was made of production control and
planning methods, inspection and quality control methods,
and any cost system being used.
The work performed by each plant in World War II
on either a prime or a sub-contract basis was considered for
its possible aid in indicating the work for which it might
best be suited. A listing was made of each of the prin-
ciple items produced, quantitatively or in dollars, and the
percentage of the plant’s capacity devoted to war produc-
tion was indicated. A listing was also made of the maximum
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number of employees, male and female, employed during the
war, stating the percentage of skilled workers.
Consideration was given to the ability of the plant
to expand its production to produce additional quantities
of its regular products in an emergency either on presently
available property or adjoining property. Special atten-
tion was given to overloading service utilities.
Each plant also considered what other work, other
than that performed in World War II, it might be specially
qualified to do for the Armed Forces or the essential econ-
omy. The plant manager recommended whether or not his
plant should do such work in case of sjiother war, and if
he did recommend it, he had to state what would be required
to get it under way.
b. Survey by Each Division
Each division was given one month to prepare and
submit its report, based on the reports from each plant.
The division report stated the name and address of division
headquarters, the plants operated by the division, their
location, and the manager’s name for each plant.
The division report also included an organiz-
ation and key personnel chart, listing the scientifically
trained men with their field of specialization, and the prin-
cipal key personnel then with a thumbnail sketch of their age,
experience, and education.
The total employees for the division at the time
'... -
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of the survey were tabulated for the headquarters and for
the plants by male, female, hourly, and annual, giving
the percentage of skilled and unskilled workers. The max-
imum number of employees during World War II were also
tabulated by male, female, and total, giving the percen-
tage of skilled workers.
The report also covered divisional engineering,
design, research, and laboratory facilities available with
a brief description of each by location. Production con-
trol and planning methods were also described.
A summary tabulation was made for the entire
division of products produced during the current year,
giving both the normal and maximum capacity for these prod-
ucts. Products produced in the division during the second
world war both on a prime and subcontract basis were listed
separately with amounts produced, giving the percentage
of the division’s capacity devoted to war work.
The division industrial mobilization represen-
tative was also required to give his attention to any other
products, other than those produced during World War II or
after, which the division might be specially qualified to
perform for the Armed Forces or the essential civilian
economy. He was asked to state whether or not he recom-
mended that the division do such work in the event of an-
other war and to describe what steps would be required to
get it under way.
•-i.
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c. Consolidated Report
A compilation was made of all of the reports
from the operating divisions, and an over-all survey for
the entire company completed.
The summary included a description of the com-
pany, its products, and size with a table of organization
and description of key personnel.
A listing was made of the principal products and
amounts produced during the current year, giving both max-
imum and normal production for each product. A separate
listing was made of all products, showing amounts produced
during World War II on a prime or sub-contract basis,
stating the percentage of tne company’s capacity devoted
to war production.
The personnel employed currently was tabulated
by annual and hourly workers with total, and by male and
female workers with total. The maximum number of employees
during World War II were classified by male, female, and
total, giving the percentage of skilled workers.
Finally, the industrial mobilization represent-
ative for the plant was also required to give consideration
to products, other than those produced during or since
World War II, which the company might be specially qual-
ified to perform for the Armed Forces or tne essential civ-
ilian economy, and to state whether or not he recommended
that the company perform such work in the event of another
..
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war. He was also required to describe what steps would be
necessary to get this work under way.
5. Conclusion
From this outline of the detailed analysis made
by the Koppers Company, it is evident that the company
has grasped the full significance of the importance of
industrial mobilization planning. This company entered
the program wholeheartedly, throwing its resources with
the government in a comprehensive study of its productive
capacity. Of course, by undertaking a survey of this sort
a company must bear the expenses with the returns not immed
iately obvious, but the long-run advantages are certainly
evident.
Even from a superficial study of industrial mobil
ization planning, it becomes almost immediately apparent
that the success of the entire program rests squarely on
the shoulders of the industry of the United States.
The Koppers Company has apparently recognized
its patriotic duty in this respect and has given freely
its time and talent to the cause. It is to the credit of
American industry that the example of the Koppers Company
appears to be the rule, and this fact points to outstanding
success in the attainment of the goal.
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CHAPTER XIV
COE CLUE
I
OR
1. Two Schools of Thought
There are those who hold that the readjustments
for war should be kept to the barest minimum, thus keeping
the wealth-producing capacity of industry adequate for
botn the war needs and also the usual demands of a civil-
ian economy. They hold that all business will thus pros-
per, paying good wages and earning high profits. The
economy will be held at a high peak, and everyone will
benefit. These people think only in terms of the wars of
the past, not in terms of total war.
Others feel that the most rigid economies should
be practiced in any war in order to throw the entire indus-
trial might of our country into the battle. The entire
country would concentrate on the business of winning the
war to insure an early victory.
From all indications, if there is another war,
we will have no choice between these alternatives. If
another war does come, our war effort will have to be total
and the most rigid economies practiced.
2. M eed for Planning
Ve can not know whetner or not war is inevitable,
but we do know that it is at least a possibility. To pro-
tect ourselves, we should plan as if war were inevitable.
In the past wars, the United States has had
.I
sufficient time to arm and bring the industrial might of
the greatest productive machine in the world into the battle.
Our overwhelming superiority in industrial know-how and
mass production methods is the mightiest weapon we have,
but it has been traditionally slow moving. To bring this
potential into play requires months of patient, painstaking
planning
.
It is certainly very likely, almost absolutely
certain, that any future war of major proportions will
involve this country. It is also just as true that the
United States, as the strongest potential enemy of any
agressor nation, will have to be neutralized first, ho
nation will ever again repeat the costly mistakes of past
agressors in underestimating the power of the Unitea States.
We will be attacked with great force and without warning,
and we will not be allowed the time to rearm, time which
has been our salvation in the past.
3. Planning heeded for Various Phases of the Economy
When and if the attack does come, we must have
detailed plans for immediate mobilization waiting to be
executed immediately. We must be able to effect the trans-
ition from a peacetime to a wartime economy without costly
delays
.
Our manpower must be mobilized at once and rigid-
ly controlled, allocating men between industry and the
Armed Forces. Painstaking studies of the needs of industry
. .. j /: .
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and the services, a careful inventory of the available man-
power, and an analysis of any legislation which will be
needed- all of these steps must be prepared in advance.
Industry must have detailed production plans
waiting to be executed at the declaration of an emergency.
The conversion must start the day M Day is declared.
Industry must work closely with the Armed Forces to keep
these plans current.
We must have reserves of tools and materials on
hand with detailed plans for their distribution and alloca-
tion. Critical items should be carefully considered in
order to insure an adequate supply. The organization to
administer this phase of mobilization should be an existing
body to avoid any possible source of delay in activating
an agency to care for this vital function.
Standby plants should be readied at once, having
been maintained in operating condition during the years
preceeding the emergency.
Since a war economy can not function in the midst
of economic chaos, economic stabilization measures will be
needed to control the pressures toward economic disruption.
These controls must be planned in advance, awaiting only
the approval of the legislature. In a period of full em-
ployment, such as we are experiencing today, with the money
supply already inflated, a major war effort would require
a substantial lowering of living standards and would pre-
.•
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sent unusual economic problems.
Our rail, highway, air, and water systems are
taxed even today to meet the demands of an active peace-
time economy. Wartime demands would require extremely
careful and skillful handling on the part of a government
control agency. The blueprints for co-ordinating and allo-
cating transportation facilities is a very important part
of industrial mobilization planning.
All sources of industrial and domestic power will
also have to be controlled in some measure to insure that
proper conservation measures will be taken. All of these
steps will have to be worked out in advance.
4. Stake of Private Enterprise
hone of these objectives can be attained without
painstaking, detailed planning with the wholehearted co-op-
eration of industry. Now is the time to lay these necessary
plans in order to achieve maximum preparedness in the min-
imum time.
This thesis was not intended to point with alarm
to an impending war, but rather to emphasize the need for
preparation. War can certainly be avoided, but we must
always be prepared for any eventuality. The costs of lay-
ing these plans for mobilization represent a modest invest-
ment for the possible savings.
Private industry has a great stake in the plans
for mobilization, not only because of the probable effects
.
of any future crisis on the industrial segment of our econ-
omy, but also because of the harmony that can be achieved
through the proper assignment of products and the antici-
pation of bottlenecks and difficulties of all sorts. Pri-
vate enterprise carries a tremendous responsibility in the
planning for any future conflict because it can spell the
difference between outstanding achievements or abortive
efforts
.
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APPENDIX
THE NATIONAL SECURITY aCI OF 1947

IMATIQJMiiL LaCUnllY aCT OF 19A7
[Public Law 253
—
80th Congress]
[Chapter 343—1st Session]
[S. 758]
AN ACT
To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a
National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department
of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the
activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and
agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of A merica in Congress assembled
,
SHORT TITLE
That this Act may be cited as the “National Security Act of 1947”.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
Title I
—
Coordination for National Security
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—
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DECLARATION OF POLICY
Sec. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to
provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United
States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and
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procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Govern-
ment relating to the national security
;
to provide three military depart-
ments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy
(including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and
the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components;
to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction
under civilian control but not to merge them
;
to provide for the effective
strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under
unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land,
naval, and air forces.
TITLE I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Sec. 101. (a) There is hereby established a council to be known
as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred
to as the “Council”).
The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the
Council : Provided
,
That in his absence he may designate a member
of the Council to preside in his place.
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies
relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and
the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate
more effectively in matters involving the national security.
The Council shall be composed of the President; the Secretary of
State; the Secretary of Defense, appointed under section 202; the
Secretary of the Army, referred to in section 205; the Secretary of
the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force, appointed under section
207
;
the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board,
appointed under section 103
;
and such of the following named officers
as the President may designate from time to time: The Secretaries
of the executive departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board
appointed under section 213, and the Chairman of the Research and
Development Board appointed under section 214; but no such addi-
tional member shall be designated until the advice and consent of
the Senate has been given to his appointment to the office the holding
of which authorizes his designation as a member of the Council.
(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President
may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the poli-
cies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government
relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of
the President, be the duty of the Council
—
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and
risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential
military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose
of making recommendations to the President in connection
therewith; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the
departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the
national security, and to make recommendations to the President
in connection therewith.
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(c) The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian
executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President, and
who shall receive compensation at the rate of $10,000 a year. The
executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is hereby
authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification
Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such
personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be
prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its
functions.
(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommenda-
tions, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate
or as the President may require.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security.
Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central
Intelligence, wTho shall be the head thereof. The Director shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services or
from among individuals in civilian life. The Director shall receive
compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year.
(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed
as Director then
—
(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall be
subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (mili-
tai'y or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to
him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department
of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the
Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and
(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control,
powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is author-
ized or directed to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed
services or any component thereof, the Department of the Army,
the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force,
or any branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to
any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the
office of Director of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and
his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any
status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed serv-
ices, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident
to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such
commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office of Director,
receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case
may be) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of
service and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the
expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the
amount by which $14,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military
pay and allowances.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 0 of the Act of
August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law,
the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate
the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever
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he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests
of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right
of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any
other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible
for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of
the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of
national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the
direction of the National Security Council
—
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters con-
cerning such intelligence activities of the Government depart-
ments and agencies as relate to national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council
for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national
security
;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the
national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination
of such intelligence within the Government using where appro-
priate existing agencies and facilities: Provided
,
That the Agency
shall have no police, subpena, law-enforcement powers, or inter-
nal-security functions : Provided further
,
That the departments
and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect,
evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence:
And provided further
,
That the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and meth-
ods from unauthorized disclosure
;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence
agencies, such additional services of common concern as the
National Security Council determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally
;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct.
(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council
and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments
and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided,
relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the
Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to
the national security and is possessed by such departments and other
agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be
made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation,
evaluation, and dissemination : Provided
,
however
,
That upon the
written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the
Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation,
evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national
security.
(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection
(a) has taken office
—
(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Keg. 1337,
1339, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and
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(2)
the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelli-
gence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency,
and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances
of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or
authorized to be made available for such Group shall be avail-
able and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner
for expenditure by the Agency.
NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD
Sec. 103. (a) There is hereby established a National Security
Resources Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the
“Board”) to be composed of the Chairman of the Board and such
heads or representatives of the various executive departments and
independent agencies as may from time to time be designated by the
President to be members of the Board. The Chairman of the Board
shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the
rate of $14,000 a year.
(b) The Chairman of the Board, subject to the direction of the
President, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the
Classification Act of 1S23, as amended, to appoint and fix the com-
pensation of such personnel as may be necessary to assist the Board
in carrying out its functions.
(c) It shall be the function of the Board to advise the President
concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian
mobilization, including
—
(1) policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization
in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum
utilization of the Nation’s manpower in the event of war;
(2) programs for the effective use in time of war of the
Nation’s natural and industrial resources for military and civilian
needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian econ-
omy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy
to war needs and conditions
;
(3) policies for unifying, in time of war; the activities of Fed-
eral agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with
production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of mili-
tary or civilian supplies, materials, and products;
(4) the relationship between potential supplies of, and poten-
tial requirements for, manpower, resources, and productive facili-
ties in time of war
;
(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic
and critical material, and for the conservation of these reserves;
(6) the strategic relocation of industries, services, government,
and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is
essential to the Nation’s security.
(d) In performing its functions, the Board shall utilize to the
maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and
agencies of the Government.
[Pub. Law 253 ] 6
TITLE II—THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
establishment of the national military establishment
Seo. 201. (a) There is hereby established the National Military
Establishment, and the Secretary of Defense shall be the head
thereof.
(b) The National Military Establishment shall consist of the
Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the
Department of the Air Force, together with all other agencies created
under title II of this Act.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Seo. 202. (a) There shall be a Secretary of Defense, who shall
be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate : Provided
,
That a person who has
within ten years been on active duty as a commissioned officer in a
Regular component of the armed services shall not be eligible for
appointment as Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense
shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relat-
ing to the national security. Under the direction of the President
and subject to the provisions of this Act he shall perform the
following duties
:
(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National
Military Establishment and for all of the departments and
agencies therein
;
(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such
departments and agencies
;
(3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplica-
tion or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply,
transportation, storage, health, and research
;
(4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget
estimates of the departments and agencies comprising the National
Military Establishment; formulate and determine the budget
estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and super-
vise the budget programs of such departments and agencies under
the applicable appropriation Act
:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the Secretary
of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air
Force from presenting to the President or to the Director of the
Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any report
or recommendation relating to his department which he may deem
necessary : And provided further, That the Department of the Army,
the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force
shall be administered as individual executive departments by their
respective Secretaries and all powers and duties relating to such
departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense
by this Act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries.
(b) The Secretary of Defense shall submit annual written reports
to the President and the Congress covering expenditures, work, and
accomplishments of the National Military Establishment, together
with such recommendations as he shall deem appropriate.
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(c) The Secretary of Defense shall cause a seal of office to be made
for the National Military Establishment, of such design as the Presi-
dent shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.
MILITARY ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY
Sec. 203. Officers of the armed services may be detailed to duty
as assistants and personal aides to the Secretary of Defense, but he
shall not establish a military staff.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
Sec. 204. (a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to appoint
from civilian life not to exceed three special assistants to advise and
assist him in the performance of his duties. Each such special assist-
ant shall receive compensation at the rate of $10,000 a year.
(b) The Secretary of Defense is authorized, subject to the civil-
service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint
and fix the compensation of such other civilian personnel as may be
necessary for the performance of the functions of the National Mili-
tary Establishment other than those of the Departments of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec. 205. (a) The Department of War shall hereafter be designated
the Department of the Army, and the title of the Secretary of War
shall be changed to Secretary of the Army. Changes shall be made
in the titles of other officers and activities of the Department of the
Army as the Secretary of the Army may determine.
(b) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions relating to the
Department of War or to any officer or activity whose title is changed
under this section shall, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, be deemed to relate to the Department of the
Army within the National Military Establishment or to such officer or
activity designated by his or its new title.
(c) The term “Department of the Army” as used in this Act shall be
construed to mean the Department of the Army at the seat of govern-
ment and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installa-
tions, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the
Department of the Army.
(d) The Secretary of the Army shall cause a seal of office to be made
for the Department of the Army, of such design as the President may
approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.
(e) In general the United States Army, within the Department of
the Army, shall include land combat and service forces and such avia-
tion and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be
organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained
combat incident to operations on land. It shall be responsible for the
preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of
war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated
joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components
of the Army to meet the needs of war.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Sec. 206
.
(a) The term “Department of the Navy” as used in this
Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat
of government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the
entire operating forces of the United States Navy, including naval
aviation, and of the United States Marine Corps, including the
reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters,
forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control
or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States
Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.
(b)
^
In general the United States Navy, within the Department of
the Navy, shall include naval combat and services forces and such
aviation as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained,
and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to
operations at sea. It shall be responsible for the preparation of naval
forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as other-
wise assigned, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization
plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to
meet the needs of war.
All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as
part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation shall
consist of combat and service and training forces, and shall include
land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations,
all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and
activities of the United States Navy, and the entire remainder of the
aeronautical organization of the United States Navy, together with the
personnel necessary therefor.
The Navy shall be generally responsible for naval reconnaissance,
antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping.
The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organ-
ization and equipment of naval combat and service elements; matters
of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between
the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.
(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of
the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such
aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be
organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of
combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service
with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and
for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the
prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine
Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force,
those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics,
technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition,
the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for
service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detach-
ments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases,
and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct:
Provided
,
That such additional duties shall not detract from or inter-
fere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily
organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accordance
with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peace-
time components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Sec. 207. fa) Within the National Military Establishment there is
hereby established an executive department to be known as the Depart-
ment of the Air Force, and a Secretary of the Air Force, who shall be
the head thereof. The Secretary of the Air Force shall be appointed
from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate.
(b) Section 158 of the Revised Statutes is amended to include the
Department of the Air Force and the provisions of so much of title IV
of the Revised Statutes as now or hereafter amended as is not incon-
sistent with this Act shall be applicable to the Department of the
Air Force.
(c) The term “Department of the Air Force” as used in this Act
shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air Force at the
seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve com-
ponents, installations, activities, and functions under the control or
supervision of the Department of the Air Force.
(d) There shall be in the Department of the Air Force an Under
Secretary of the Air Force and two Assistant Secretaries of the Air
Force, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(e) The several officers of the Department of the Air Force shall
perform such functions as the Secretary of the Air Force may
prescribe.
(f) So much of the functions of the Secretary of the Army and
of the Department of the Army, including those of any officer of
such Department, as are assigned to or under the control of the
Commanding General, Army Air Forces, or as are deemed by the
Secretary of Defense to be necessary or desirable for the operations
of the Department of the Air Force or the United States Air Force,
shall be transferred to and vested in the Secretary of the Air Force
and the Department of the Air Force: Provided
,
That the National
’Guard Bureau shall, in addition to the functions and duties per-
formed by it for the Department of the Army, be charged with similar
functions and duties for the Department of the Air Force, and shall
be the channel of communication between the Department of the Air
Force and the several States on all matters pertaining to the Air
National Guard : And provided further
,
That, in order to permit an
orderly transfer, the Secretary of Defense may, during the transfer
period hereinafter prescribed, direct that the Department of the Army
shall continue for appropriate periods to exercise any of such func-
tions, insofar as they relate to the Department of the Air Force, or
the United States Air Force or their property and personnel. Such
of the property, personnel, and records of the Department of the Army
used in the exercise of functions transferred under this subsection as
the Secretary of Defense shall determine shall be transferred or
assigned to the Department of the Air Force.
(g) The Secretary of the Air Force shall cause a seal of office to
be made for the Department of the Air Force, of such device as the
President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.
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TTNTTED STATES AIR FORCE
Sec. 208. (a) The United States Air Force is hereby established
under the Department of the Air Force. The Army Air Forces, the
Air Corps, United States Army, and the General Headquarters Air
Force (Air Force Combat Command), shall be transferred to the
United States Air Force.
(b) There shall be a Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, who
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, for a term of four years from among the officers
of general rank who are assigned to or commissioned in the United
States Air Force. Under the direction of the Secretary of the Air
Force, the Chief of Staff. United States Air Force, shall exercise
command over the United States Air Force and shall be charged with
the duty of carrying into execution all lawful orders and directions
which may be transmitted to him. The functions of the Commanding
General, General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Com-
mand), and of the Chief of the Air Corps and of the Commanding
General, Army Air Forces, shall be transferred to the Chief of S a if.
United States Air Force. When such transfer becomes effective, the
offices of the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, and Assist-
ants to the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, provided for
by the Act of June 4, 1920, as amended (41 Stat. 768), and Command-
ing General, General Headquarters Air Force, provided for by section
5 of the Act of June 16, 1936 (49 Stat. 1525), shall cease to exist.
While holding office as Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, the
incumbent shall hold a grade and receive allowances equivalent to
those prescribed by law for the Chief of Staff, United States Army.
The Chief of Staff, United States Army, the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall take rank
among themselves according to their relative dates of appointment
as such, and shall each take rank above all other officers on the active
list of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: Provided
,
That nothing in
this Act shall have the effect of changing the relative rank of the
present Chief of Staff, United States Army, and the present Chief of
Naval Operations.
(c) All commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men,
commissioned, holding warrants, or enlisted, in the Air Corps, United
States Army, or the Army Air Forces, shall be transferred in branch
to the United States Air Force. All other commissioned officers, war-
rant officers, and enlisted men, who are commissioned, hold warrants,
or are enlisted, in any component of the Army of the United States
and who are under the authority or command of the Commanding
General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued under the authority or
command of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and under
the jurisdiction of the Department of the Air Force. Personnel whose
status is affected by this subsection shall retain their existing commis-
sions, warrants, or enlisted status in existing components of the armed
forces unless otherwise altered or terminated in accordance with exist-
ing law
;
and they shall not be deemed to have been appointed to a new
or different office or grade, or to have vacated their permanent or
temporary appointments in an existing component of the armed
forces, solely by virtue of any change in status under this subsection.
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No such change in status shall alter or prejudice the status of any
individual so assigned, so as to deprive him of any right, benefit, or
privilege to which he may be entitled under existing law.
(d) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of the Air Force,
all property, records, installations, agencies, activities, projects, and
civilian personnel under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or com-
mand of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be con-
tinued to the same extent under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or
command, respectively, of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force,
in the Department of the Air Force.
(e) For a period of two years from the date of enactment of this
Act, personnel (both military and civilian), property, records,
installations, agencies, activities, and projects may be transferred
between the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air
Force by direction of the Secretary of Defense.
(f) In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation
forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be
* organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained
offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be
responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the
effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in
accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion
of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of
war.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF TRANSFERS
Sec. 209. Each transfer, assignment, or change in status under sec-
tion 207 or section 208 shall take effect upon such date or dates as may
be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.
WAR COUNCIL
Sec, 210. There shall be within the National Military Establish-
ment a War Council composed of the Secretary of Defense, as Chair-
man, who shall have power of decision
;
the Secretary of the Army
;
the
Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chief of
Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The War Council shall advise
the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the
armed forces, and shall consider and report on such other matters
as the Secretary of Defense may direct.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Sec. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the National Mili-
tary Establishment the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the
Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations;
the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and the Chief of Staff to
the Commander in Chief, if there be one.
(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the
Secretary of Defense, it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
—
(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic
direction of the military forces
;
(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military
services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;
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(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such
unified commands are in the interest of national security;
(4) to formulate policies for joint training of the" military
forces
;
(5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of
members of the military forces
;
(6) to review major material and personnel requirements of
the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans
;
and
(7) to provide United States representation on the Military
Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military
advisers to the President and the Secretaiy of Defense and shall per-
form such other duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense
may direct or as may be prescribed by law.
JOINT STAFF
Sec. 212. There shall be, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Joint
Staff to consist of not to exceed one hundred officers and to be composed
of approximately equal numbers of officers from each of the three armed
services. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof
appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall perform such duties as
may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director shall be
an officer junior in grade to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
munitions board
Sec. 213. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military
Establishment a Munitions Board (hereinafter in this section referred
to as the “Board”).
(b) The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the
head thereof, and an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary from
each of the three military departments, to be designated in each case by
the Secretaries of their respective departments. The Chairman shall
be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate
of $14,000 a year.
(c) It shall be the duty of the Board under the direction of the
Secretary of Defense and in support of strategic and logistic plans
prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
—
(1) to coordinate the appropriate activities within the National
Military Establishment with regard to industrial matters, includ-
ing the procurement, production, and distribution plans of the
departments and agencies comprising the Establishment
;
(2) to plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization;
(3) to recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities
among the several military services and to plan for standardiza-
tion of specifications and for the greatest practicable allocation
of purchase authority of technical equipment and common use
items on the basis of single procurement
;
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(4) to prepare estimates of potential production, procurement,
and personnel for use in evaluation of the logistic feasibility oi
strategic operations
;
(5) to determine relative priorities of the various segments
of the military procurement programs
;
(6) to supervise such subordinate agencies as are or may be
created to consider the subjects falling within the scope of the
Board’s responsibilities;
(7) to make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve
existing interservice agencies operating in the fields of procure-
ment, production, and distribution in such manner as to promote
efficiency and economy
;
(8) to maintain liaison with other departments and agencies
for the proper correlation of military requirements with the
civilian economy, particularly in regard to the procurement or
disposition of strategic and critical material and the maintenance
of adequate reserves of such material, and to make recommenda-
tions as to policies in connection therewith
;
(9) to assemble and review material and personnel require-
ments presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those presented
by the production, procurement, and distribution agencies
assigned to meet military needs, and to make recommendations
thereon to the Secretary of Defense; and
(10) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense
may direct.
(d) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken
office, the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board shall cease to
exist and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the
Munitions Board.
(e) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such
personnel and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required
by the Board for the performance of its functions.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
Sec. 214. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military
Establishment a Kesearch and Development Board (hereinafter in
this section referred to as the “Board”). The Board shall be com-
posed of a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof, and two repre-
sentatives from each of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force, to be designated by the Secretaries of their respective
Departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year. The
purpose of the Board shall be to advise the Secretary of Defense
as to the status of scientific research relative to the national security,
and to assist him in assuring adequate provision for research and
development on scientific problems relating to the national security.
(b) It shall be the duty of the Board, under the direction of the
Secretary of Defense
—
(1) to prepare a complete and integrated program of research
and development for military purposes;
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(2) to advise with regard to trends in scientific research relat-
ing to national security and the measures necessary to assure con-
tinued and increasing progress
;
(3) to recommend measures of coordination of research and
development among the military departments, and allocation
among them of responsibilities for specific programs of joint
interest
;
(4) to formulate policy for the National Military Establish-
ment in connection with research and development matters in-
volving agencies outside the National Military Establishment;
(5) to consider the interaction of research and development
and strategy, and to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connec-
tion therewith; and
(6) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense
may direct.
(c) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken
office, the Joint Research and Development Board shall cease to exist
and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Research
and Development Board.
(d) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such
personnel and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required
by the Board for the performance of its functions.
TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS
COMPENSATION OF SECRETARIES
Sec. 301. (a ) The Secretary of Defense shall receive the compensa-
tion prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.
(b) The Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and
the Secretary of the Air Force shall each receive the compensation
prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.
UNDER SECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES
Sec. 302. The Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force shall each receive compensation
at the rate of $10,000 a year and shall perform such duties as the
Secretaries of their respective departments may prescribe.
ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND PERSONNEL
Sec. 803. (a) The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
National Security Resources Board, and the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized to appoint such advisory committees and
to employ, consistent with other provisions of this Act, such part-
time advisory personnel as they may deem necessary in carrying out
their respective functions and the functions of agencies under their
control, Persons holding other offices or positions under the United
States for which they receive compensation while serving as members
of such committees snail receive no additional compensation for such
service. Other members of such committees and other part-time
advisory personnel so employed may serve without compensation or
may receive compensation at a rate not to exceed $35 for each day of
service, as determined by the appointing authority.
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(b) Service of an individual as a member of any such advisory
committee, or in any other part-time capacity for a department or
agency hereunder, shall not be considered as service bringing such
individual within the provisions of section 109 or 113 of the Criminal
Code (U. S. C., 1940 edition, title 18, secs. 198 and 203), or section
19 (e) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, unless the act of such
individual, which by such section is made unlawful when performed
by an individual referred to in such section, is with respect to any
particular matter which directly involves a department or agency
which such person is advising or in which such department or agency
is directly interested.
STATUS OF TRANSFERRED CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
_
Sec. 304. All transfers of civilian personnel under this Act shall be
without change in classification or compensation, but the head of any
department or agency to which such a transfer is made is authorized
to make such changes in the titles and designations and prescribe such
changes in the duties of such personnel commensurate with their classi-
fication as he may deem necessary and appropriate.
SAVING PROVISIONS
Sec. 305. (a) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions appli-
cable with respect to any function, activity, personnel, property,
records, or other thing transferred under this Act, or with respect to
any officer, department, or agency, from which such transfer is made,
shall, except to the extent rescinded, modified, superseded, terminated,
or made inapplicable by or under authority of law, have the same effect
as if such transfer had not been made; but, after any such transfer,
any such law, order, regulation, or other action which vested functions
in or otherwise related to any officer, department, or agency from
which such transfer was made shall, insofar as applicable with respect
to the function, activity, personnel, property, records or other thing
transferred and to the extent not inconsistent with other provisions of
this Act, be deemed to have vested such function in or relate to the
officer, department, or agency to which the transfer was made.
(b) No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or
against the head of any department or agency or other officer of the
United States, in his official capacity or in relation to the discharge
of his official duties, shall abate by reason of the taking effect of any
transfer or change in title under the provisions of this Act; and, in
the case of any such transfer, such suit, action, or other proceeding
may be maintained bj7 or against the successor of such head or other
officer under the transfer, but only if the court shall allow the same
to be maintained on motion or supplemental petition filed within
twelve months after such transfer takes effect, showing a necessity for
the survival of such suit, action, or other proceeding to obtain settle-
ment of the questions involved.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of the second paragraph of
section 5 of title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, the existing
organization of the War Department under the provisions of Executive
Order Numbered 9082 of February 28, 1942, as modified by Executive
Order Numbered 9722 of May 13, 1946, and the existing organization
of the Department of the Navy under the provisions of Executive
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Order Numbered 9635 of September 29, 1945, including the assignment
of functions to organizational units within the War and Navy Depart-
ments, may, to the extent determined by the Secretary of Defense,
continue in force for two years following the date of enactment of this
Act except to the extent modified by the provisions of this Act or under
the authority of law.
TRANSFER OF FUNDS
Sec. 306. All unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations,
nonappropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter made
available for use by or on behalf of the Army Air Forces or officers
thereof, shall be transferred to the Department of the Air Force for
use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Such other
unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated
funds, or other funds available or hereafter made available for use
by the Department of War or the Department of the Army in exercise
of functions transferred to the Department of the Air Force under
this Act, as the Secretary of Defense shall determine, shall be trans-
ferred to the Department of the Air Force for use in connection with
the exercise of its functions. Unexpended balances transferred under
this section may be used for the purposes for which the appropriations,
allocations, or other funds were originally made available, or for new
expenditures occasioned by the enactment of this Act. The transfers
herein authorized may be made with or without warrant action as may
be appropriate from time to time from any appropriation covered by
this section to any other such appropriation or to such new accounts
established on the books of the Treasury as may be determined to be
necessax-y to carry into effect provisions of this Act.
authorization for appropriations
Sec. 307. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such
sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions
and purposes of this Act.
definitions
Sec. 308. (a) As used in this Act, the term “function” includes
functions, powers, and duties.
(b) As used in this Act, the term “budget program” refers to recom-
mendations as to the apportionment, to the allocation and to the review
of allotments of appropriated funds.
SEPARABILITY
Sec. 309. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the
remainder of the Act and of the application of such provision to other
persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE
Sec. 310. (a) The first sentence of section 202 (a) and sections 1,
2, 307, 308, 309, and 310 shall take effect immediately upon the enact-
ment of this Act.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a)
,
the provisions of this Act
shall take effect on whichever of the following days is the earlier:
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The day after the day upon which the Secretary of Defense first
appointed takes office, or the sixtieth day after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act.
SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY
Sec. 311. Paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of section 1 of the Act
entitled “An Act to provide for the performance of the duties of the
office of President in case of the removal, resignation, death, or in-
ability both of the President and Vice President”, approved July 18,
1947, is amended by striking out “Secretary of War” and inserting in
lieu thereof “Secretary of Defense”, and by striking out “Secretary of
the Navy,”.
Approved July 26, 1947.
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